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This analysis examines the information dimension of the ongoing Maoist 
insurgency and counterinsurgency in Nepal. The paper follows two lines of 
research: first, it presents an analytic framework that properly conceives the 
challenge of counterinsurgency and calibrates government actions through the 
use of information systems and operations; then, it applies this framework to the 
contemporary crisis in Nepal in order to postulate effective counterinsurgency 
strategies for the Nepalese government and its supporters.  
The paper analyzes the environment, structure, and dynamics of the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent systems in Nepal to determine the extent to 
which information is—or could be—employed in the fight. Based on the 
conditions identified in the research, the paper proposes information-based 
strategies and tactics that favorably affect conflict dynamics on behalf of the 
Nepalese government. Finally, the paper offers constructive and appropriate 
ways for the U.S. to support Nepalese information operations efforts in the 
counterinsurgency.  
This research focuses primarily on use of information in insurgency, but it 
also realizes that information strategies must be balanced and blended with other 
important dimensions of insurgent conflict. Thus, the insights gained here are 
intended to support further analysis of the larger set of dynamics that shape 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency began in 1996 as a by-product of political and 
ideological disagreement concerning the proper course and priorities of 
constitutional governance in the country. In the nine years since then, the conflict 
has reportedly cost Nepal billions of dollars, killed over 12,000 people, and has 
transformed the world’s only Hindu kingdom into a state of chaos that threatens 
its very existence as a nation. The consensus opinion of various Nepalese and 
foreign analysts is that the Maoist insurgency began and bloomed as a 
consequence of several factors: ignorance of the plight of lower segments of 
Nepali society; weak or non-existent governance in affected areas; and 
inappropriate or ineffective resistance to Maoist influence and operations.  
On February 1, 2005 Nepal’s King Gyanendra staged a “royal coup” by 
sacking the country’s elected—but largely ineffective and corrupt—government, 
and assumed direct executive powers in order to defeat the Maoist “terrorists” 
that have plagued the country. The king’s bold move was purportedly designed to 
restore peace and create conditions for democracy in Nepal. In his power grab, 
however, King Gyanendra curtailed civil liberties and democratic institutions. The 
king severely limited basic freedoms of expression and assembly, shuttered or 
censored most independent media outlets, and implemented a national state of 
emergency. Most significant, at least with respect to the Maoists, King 
Gyanendra unleashed the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to conduct strategic 
offensive operations against the Maoists. 
Internal and international reactions to the royal moves have been mixed: 
high praise from many citizens tired of the bloody conflict and demanding 
aggressive moves against the Maoists; outrage from Nepalese political parties, 
other citizens, and the country’s external supporters; and ridicule from the 
Maoists themselves. Whatever one thinks of the king’s actions in February, it 
seems the more important question is what lies ahead—i.e., how do the 
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government’s recent actions and policies address the Maoist insurgency, and are 
the measures likely to succeed where efforts over the past nine years have not? 
Events in Nepal may prove otherwise, but at first glance the king’s actions seem 
counterintuitive to what is necessary to ensure political control and support of the 
population, and to defeat the insurgency there. 
The resolution of Nepal’s internal conflict begins with a proper 
appreciation and conceptualization of the problem of insurgency, applied to the 
circumstances of contemporary Nepal. Insurgency may be viewed as an armed 
contest between a state and a counter-state for absolute political control of a 
subject population and its associated resources. Both sides of the conflict have 
essentially the same basic strategies available to pursue their respective goals of 
gaining popular support and political control, but each side has strengths and 
weaknesses that constrain its immediate strategic and tactical choices. Where, 
when, and how each side applies these choices affects the achievement of its 
goals and determines the ultimate victor. This fundamental dynamic holds true in 
Nepal today. 
A cursory reading of the history of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency and the 
country’s broader political, social, and economic problems leads to two 
interconnected observations regarding the insurgency’s roots and remedies. 
First, the Maoist insurgency did not just ‘happen’ suddenly in February 1996—it 
was the product of a nascent democratic government’s inability to resolve or limit 
political disputes of its divergent parties within the realm of dialogue. Second, the 
insurgency’s persistent growth and survival reflect a perceived legitimacy in the 
Maoists’ declared goals of reducing historical social and economic inequities 
between Nepal’s ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Clearly, the fissures created by political 
disputes created space for radical counter-state elements to operate; the same 
fissures all but ensured that delivery of essential goods and services to the 
people—especially the isolated and rural poor—would take a back seat to the 
political power struggles in Kathmandu.  
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The above observations lead one to speculate that conflict resolution in 
Nepal has three essential tracks: closing the seams in Nepali politics that hinder 
a unified national response to the crisis; addressing the legitimate needs and 
aspirations of all classes of Nepali people; and rooting out and destroying Maoist 
infrastructure and armed forces. In practical terms, there is a full spectrum of 
tools and tactics that the government might use to unify political stakeholders, to 
improve the welfare of the average Nepali, and to counter the Maoists 
ideologically and militarily. Further, many productive government efforts can be 
taken independent of Maoist actions. Analysts contend, however, that Nepal’s 
government has earnestly tried only the military option to counter the Maoists 
thus far. Conventional wisdom within Nepal and around the world indicates that 
military force alone will not resolve the insurgency there. Rather, historical 
examples suggest that only a unified and holistic counterinsurgency strategy, 
which blends all elements of the nation’s power, can resolve the people’s 
problems and lead to success over the Maoists.  
B. PURPOSE & SCOPE 
An objective observer might ask the obvious question: “If the solution to 
insurgency is so straightforward, why doesn’t the Nepalese government get it?” 
The answer to this question is, foremost, that there are fundamentally inadequate 
and disparate appreciations and conceptualizations of the insurgency among 
members of Nepal’s political and security institutions. To use a medical analogy, 
it is extremely hard to determine the right prescription for a disease if the 
diagnosis is grossly wrong or not agreed upon. Fortunately, conceptions can be 
fixed and agreed upon if the participants are willing. But, Nepal also has severe 
economic, political, and social constraints that shape the solution and affect its 
implementation. To use the same medical analogy as above, one would not 
prescribe a drug for a patient if he or she has a known and dire allergic reaction 
to it. Nepal’s constraints may be overcome or mitigated, however, provided its 
government and supporters adopt a unified strategy and make informed choices 
that are calibrated to achieve maximum gains and avoid dire losses.  
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The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to present an analytic 
framework that properly conceives the challenge of counterinsurgency and 
calibrates government actions through the use of information systems and 
operations; and second, to apply this framework to the contemporary crisis in 
Nepal in order to postulate effective counterinsurgency strategies for the 
Nepalese government and its supporters, particularly the United States. The 
analysis attempts to cast a wide net in order to establish a solid grasp of the 
people, players, and dynamics at stake in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. Although 
the analysis places available data in the most appropriate context, the real focus 
of the research is on the role and use of information systems and operations in 
the dynamics of insurgency. Several important and relevant dimensions of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency are acknowledged, but are largely ignored, in 
this analysis insofar as their effects on the outcome of the conflict. For this 
reason, insights gained from this report must be balanced by further analysis of 
the larger set of conflict dynamics that is beyond the scope of this effort.  
C. RESEARCH METHODS & STRUCTURE 
As the purpose of this paper is two-fold, so is the research approach that 
supports it. One track of research centers on presenting an analytic framework 
that describes insurgency, demonstrates the value of information systems and 
operations to insurgency, and identifies specific information tools and strategies 
that may be effective in fostering or fighting insurgency. The second track of 
research centers on developing an understanding of the conflict on the ground in 
Nepal and the relevant situational details that must be factored when applying an 
information-based counterinsurgency framework there.  
The bulk of this work is based on a rich body of second- and third-hand 
reports and analyses of insurgency and the ongoing conflict in Nepal. Time and 
travel restrictions imposed by either the Maoists or the Nepalese government 
prohibited first-hand investigations on the ground in Nepal. However, valuable 
interviews were conducted via electronic mail and telephone with US and 
Nepalese government officials and private analysts having first-hand knowledge 
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of the conflict. Available data was personally assessed and placed into the 
models where it best fit, unless a source explicitly advised otherwise. 
The research is organized along a hierarchy of ideas, going from broad 
insurgency concepts to specific recommendations for Nepal. It begins by 
discussing a proper analytic framework for conceptualizing insurgency and 
places the available data on Nepal in a dynamic systems context. The paper then 
discusses the role and value of information in the context of the insurgency 
framework, identifies relevant information tools and strategies, and articulates the 
current situation in Nepal. Finally, the paper assesses available alternatives to 
improve the use of information systems and operations in the conduct of Nepal’s 
Maoist insurgency.  
This collection of ideas is presented in the remaining four chapters: 
• Nepal’s Insurgency & Counterinsurgency: A Systems View 
• Nepal’s Insurgency & Counterinsurgency: The Information 
Dimension 
• Analysis of Alternatives 
• Conclusions  
While the three tiers of discussion are presented independently, the reader must 
understand that there is a vital thread connecting each one. Without this thread, it 

























II. NEPAL’S INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY:  
A SYSTEMS VIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter introduces a systems framework in which one may analyze 
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency and inform counterinsurgency strategy there. The 
framework characterizes the structure and dynamics of insurgent conflict. It 
identifies such conflict as two systems in competition and articulates the 
situation, players, interests, and resources in play. The analytic framework is 
essential to properly identify and interpret various geopolitical, demographic, 
cultural, economic, and topographic factors that shape Nepal’s insurgency, which 
must be considered when forming a holistic counterinsurgency strategy. Finally, 
the analytic framework highlights the central role that information, in all its forms, 
plays in insurgency situations. In a sense, this chapter may be seen as 
“intelligence preparation of the battlespace” for Nepal; moreover, it may be seen 
as conceptual preparation for planners there. While this chapter cannot possibly 
capture every detail and nuance about the conflict in Nepal in just a few pages, it 
introduces an approach and rationale for conducting further analysis in the future.  
B. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
1. Conceptual Model of Insurgency 
Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School offers a model 
of insurgency (Figure 1), which provides a useful starting point to frame this 
analysis. The model conceives of the insurgency problem as two dynamic 
systems—the state and counter-state (insurgents)—in a zero-sum competition 
for political control of a target population, set against the backdrop of geopolitical, 
social, economic, cultural and topographical conditions that describe the 
resources, constraints, and opportunities that face either side. McCormick 
highlights three primary strategies (dashed arrows in Figure 1) that either the 
state or insurgents may logically pursue to win the fight (in sequential order): gain 
control and support of the people; identify and dismantle the infrastructure of the 
opponent; or, defeat the opponent’s fielded forces. Similar strategies may be 
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used to target external support to the degree it exists and is relevant, but the 
primary object is to control the target population. When and how each side 
selects and employs these strategies depends on thorough intelligence analysis 
and a determination of the status of the competition. 
 
Figure 1.   McCormick’s Insurgency Model1 
McCormick’s insurgency model is simple and powerful, but certain aspects 
of the problem and the rationale for his suggested tactics and strategies must be 
examined in more detail if the model is to be applied to the situation in Nepal. To 
begin with, the centrality of popular support to insurgency warfare is often cited, 
but is only superficially understood by many analysts of insurgency. Slogans and 
strategies such as “by, with, and through (the population)” or “hearts and minds,” 
refer to the importance of winning popular support in an insurgency or 
counterinsurgency. These mantras sound logical, but offer little practical advice 
to address issues such as why and when it matters what people think, or when 
one must care more about the population than the enemy. These issues are 
critical to understanding insurgent and counterinsurgent systems in dynamic 
conflict and help explain why McCormick argues that the logical sequence of 
strategies begins with popular support and ends with attacks on the enemy. 
                                            
1 Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare Lecture Notes,” (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, Summer Quarter 2004). 
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In their analytic essay on insurgency, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf 
present a fundamental interpretation of the role of popular support in this form of 
conflict. Contrary to prevailing views at the time of the essay’s publication in 
1970, which emphasized the importance of popular preferences—“hearts and 
minds’’—to strategy, Leites and Wolf focused instead on the interactions 
between popular support and insurgent or counterinsurgent systems.2 In 
essence, Leites and Wolf argue what people actually do is more important than 
what they would naturally wish to do in insurgency situations. As their systems 
model shows (Figure 2), insurgents and counterinsurgents represent systems 
that convert inputs (e.g., people, money, material, and information) into outputs 
(e.g., government programs, military operations, rewards, etc.) using their 
available infrastructure (e.g., government/rebel administration, training, logistics, 
etc.). Inputs may come from intra- and/or international populations, referred to 
endogenous or exogenous sources, respectfully. A systems view of the problem, 
therefore, shows that both insurgents and counterinsurgents rely on the 
population for inputs, and each system affects the population with its output.  
The Leites and Wolf model is another simple but extremely powerful tool 
that helps explain a number of relationships and strategies in insurgency conflict. 
The authors describe two sets of popular preferences, “pure” and “assisted”3, 
which drive people to support either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent 
causes. Pure preferences reflect the choices that people would naturally make 
when given a palette of alternatives available to them, with each choice having 
similar costs but varying rewards. For example, a villager may naturally prefer to 
follow his religious code’s strict sense of duty and provide information on an 
insurgent’s whereabouts to his local police force. Given no other influences, it is 
only logical that the villager would act on his highest-payoff pure preference, 
which might be the choice to inform on the insurgent.  
                                            
2 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority; An Analytic Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), 28. 




(People, food, materiel, information, etc.)
Conversion Mechanism







Figure 2.   Insurgency as a System4 
The reality of insurgency, however, is that the population is under extreme 
duress from both the insurgent and counterinsurgent, each wanting the 
population to act in a manner more favorable to himself than his adversary. In the 
same example of the villager described above, insurgents might exact brutal 
reprisals on village informants and their families if discovered. Faced with an 
immediate choice of informing and dying versus maintaining silence and living, it 
is easy to see how the villager is “assisted” in declaring his preference for the 
latter option. Pressure on the population may come from either the government 
or the insurgent, in a range of forms: restriction of opportunities; threats or 
promises based on choices; or actual reprisals or rewards. The consequences 
tend to be near- or long-term in nature; of these, popular attention tends to focus 
on the near-term. This pressure is what Leites and Wolf say results in the 
                                            
4 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority; An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, 35. 
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population’s “assisted preferences,” which aim to motivate the public to take a 
specific course of action. 
The notion of popular support is essential to properly target, calibrate, and 
control insurgent or counterinsurgent operations. The most important concern in 
insurgency warfare is what people do, not merely what they feel or think. Every 
individual, consciously or not, conducts a cost-benefit analysis when they act: he 
or she determines which of the pure or assisted preferences has the greatest 
benefit at the least cost, and if the person is assumed to be a rational actor, he or 
she chooses that alternative. To the degree that people act upon these 
preferences and personal analyses, an insurgent or counterinsurgent strives to 
influence and manipulate such calculations so as to increase support to his own 
cause and reduce support to the adversary. 
Wherever possible and advantageous, each side in insurgency seeks to 
affect popular preferences directly as a function of the organization’s output. For 
example, an insurgent or counterinsurgent that provides strong local security, 
necessary goods, and equitable services directly to the people boosts assisted 
preferences, as a minimum—even if a villager disagrees with the administrator’s 
politics, he may be content with the services provided. Sometimes, however, the 
insurgent or counterinsurgent must attempt to influence preferences indirectly by 
raising the opponent’s production costs or projecting doubt on his ability to 
deliver his set of goods to the population. For example, insurgents may destroy a 
newly constructed government infrastructure to demonstrate their strength and, 
more importantly, the government’s weakness and wastefulness in the futile 
effort. Manipulation of assisted popular preferences, therefore, is a central 
element of insurgent warfare. 
If one overlays the Leites & Wolf systems model onto the McCormick 
insurgency model (Figure 3), it becomes clear why McCormick argues for the set 
and priority order of counterinsurgency strategies as noted previously. For either 
side, securing the support of the population or at least denying the same to the 
adversary is a primary task, since such support is a primary input to the growth 
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and production of each organization. This is largely accomplished through the 
manipulation of the population’s assisted preferences. Next, each side aims to 
improve its organizational capabilities to convert inputs into outputs, while 
disrupting or denying the adversary’s infrastructures. If successful in this 
strategy, an insurgent or counterinsurgent limits the production of outputs, which 
is hoped to further influence popular preferences in addition to any material 
effects observed. Finally, each side targets the outputs of the other where able 
and most important, in order to score direct physical or psychological damage to 
the adversary or to deny him the link back to the population. 
  
Figure 3.   Leites & Wolf Model Overlaid onto McCormick Model 
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A final set of concepts must be discussed to fully appreciate the problem 
of insurgency and the complexities involved in matters of strategy and targeting: 
the nature of the insurgency battlespace and the operational implications it has 
for each side in the conflict. Dennis Drew and Donald Snow articulate four 
foundational attributes of insurgency that counterinsurgency planners must 
consider: time; covertness; subsidiary importance of military actions; and guerrilla 
tactics.5  
First, time is an important weapon to insurgents in itself. Because they 
begin the conflict at a severe material disadvantage, insurgents require time to 
build support and military strength from which they may openly challenge the 
state.6 Additionally, the protracted nature of the struggle works against the state 
because every day that the insurgents continue to exist and operate adds a 
perception of legitimacy to their cause and is seen as a failure of the 
government.7 Second, the insurgents’ covert infrastructure is critical. Drew and 
Snow note, “the primary source of an insurgency’s strength is its underground 
organization… this infrastructure is the single most important ingredient in the 
insurgent recipe for success.”8 Leites and Wolf established the rationale for this 
statement, as infrastructure is the part of the insurgent system that converts 
inputs into outputs. The covertness of this infrastructure is essential, at least in 
the early stages of conflict, and compounds the difficulty that the 
counterinsurgent faces in identifying, disrupting, and destroying it. Third, since 
the development of covert infrastructure is so vital to an insurgent movement’s 
cause, it relegates insurgent military action to secondary importance. Drew and 
Snow state, “Without question, rebel military actions play an important role… but 
success on the battlefield is not crucial to the success of the insurgent 
                                            
5 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National 
Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 1988), 111-112. 




movement.”9 This factor is linked to the fourth attribute of insurgency: use of 
guerrilla tactics. Insurgents do not need or want to engage in large scale 
operations, where massed insurgents would pose a large signature that is easily 
tracked, targeted, and destroyed wholesale. Instead, guerrilla tactics ensure that 
insurgents avoid the asymmetric strength advantage of the state and that 
insurgents strike only when it is to their advantage to fight. Further, such tactics 
draw the state’s attention and efforts away from the non-military activities of the 
insurgent infrastructure.10 
In addition to the attributes described above, Drew and Snow highlight two 
key differences between conventional and insurgent warfare that confound 
military responses to insurgency: centers of gravity and objectives. As discussed 
above, the center of gravity for insurgent forces is clearly the covert infrastructure 
and its active or passive supporters in the population. The government’s center 
of gravity also lays in the population, for reasons established in the discussion of 
the Leites, Wolf, and McCormick models. The commingling of centers of gravity 
in the general population presents a quandary for the counterinsurgent: attacking 
the insurgent’s center of gravity may mean attacking one’s own center of 
gravity.11 This factor largely neuters the superior firepower that a strong 
conventional military might otherwise bring to bear against the insurgents, at 
least until intelligence can distinguish insurgents and their sympathizers from 
average civilians. Insurgents intentionally try to provoke a premature and 
indiscriminate state response on this center of gravity in order to draw support 
away from the state and towards the insurgents. This strategy leads into the final 
point of discussion about the nature of insurgent and counterinsurgent objectives. 
The insurgent aims primarily to survive and outlast the state—victory is defined 
as “not losing”; the counterinsurgent, however, aims to decisively defeat the 
insurgents—victory is defined as “winning”. So long as the insurgents continue to 
                                            
9 Drew and Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and 
Problems, 114. 
10 Ibid, 115. 
11 Ibid, 117. 
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fight, however small their numbers may be, they increase the relative legitimacy 
of their cause and more importantly, discredit the state due its inability to defeat a 
militarily inferior force.12 
The conceptual framework presented in this section is essential for 
understanding the nature of insurgency, the forces in play, the dynamics of 
conflict, and the essence of strategy and tactics in this form of warfare. These 
basic concepts, to varying degrees, hold true for all insurgencies and are readily 
apparent in Nepal today. The next step in forming an effective counterinsurgency 
strategy for Nepal is to put these concepts to work in a more concrete model 
where one may place facts from the real world, then postulate and visualize the 
effects of specific strategies and tactics on the conflict dynamics. 
2. Mathematical Model of Insurgency 
Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano extend the basic conceptual 
model with mathematics to illustrate the underlying calculus of the zero-sum 
insurgent competition. This calculus identifies the variables and dynamics that 
intelligence needs to illuminate and measure, and those factors which operators 
need to affect, in order for one to effectively counter an insurgency. As 
McCormick and Giordano note, there are two components to insurgent-
counterinsurgent competition: mobilization (recruitment & growth) and attrition 
(the result of head-to-head battles).13 In this game, each player’s ability to grow, 
attrit, and survive attacks is a function of its resources and strategies used to 
manipulate popular preferences and to counter its adversary. 
McCormick and Giordano mathematically represent insurgent-
counterinsurgent competition using Lanchester’s equations of conflict (Figure 4). 
Lanchester’s equations grossly simplify the forces at play in insurgent conflict, 
but they allow an analyst to experiment with strategies and tactics to see their net 
effects on the model of conflict. The three models below may be used to examine 
                                            
12 Drew and Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and 
Problems,117. 
13 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank R. Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 2-3. 
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the following: mobilization independent of attrition; attrition independent of 
mobilization; and the combined interaction between mobilization and attrition.  
 
Figure 4.   Mathematical Models of Insurgency14 
The math involved here is not complex, but the equations are subtly 
sophisticated and require some explanation in order to be useful operationally. 
Looking first at mobilization (model [A] above), each side faces essentially the 
same challenge of constrained growth. Insurgents and counterinsurgents fight to 
recruit members or supporters from the same population, up to a maximum 
capacity (kx or ky) that each organization is capable of sustaining and harnessing. 
The rate of growth is the product of an organizational growth parameter (a or b), 
the size of the recruitable population (1-x/kx or 1-y/ky), and the size of the existing 
organization (x or y). Figure 5 shows notional examples of insurgent growth 
including a typically observed path, a rapidly growing organization, and a 
movement that exceeds carrying capacity. 
                                            



































Figure 5.   Notional Insurgent Mobilization Model 
Independent of each other, either side has two implied goals for growth: 
first, to reach its maximum organizational capacity as rapidly as its infrastructure 
can support and employ; and second, to increase the recruitable population it 
may pursue. Each organization pursues these goals through strategies and 
tactics designed to improve its growth parameter and engender support to its 
cause (and thereby deprive such support from the adversary). Some tactics may 
include negative incentives aimed at the population; other tactics may be actions 
directed against the enemy.  
It is clear why and how insurgents and counterinsurgents pursue 
independent goals of growth to expand their respective influence and control, but 
what happens when the two contestants directly confront each other in battle? 
Attrition as a result of combat will have an impact on growth, but before 
discussing that connection, one must understand what happens in the battle 
itself. In the case of attrition, insurgents and counterinsurgents face a dynamic as 
described by model [B] in Figure 4. 
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Due to the nature of insurgency warfare and the unique conditions 
encountered by each side as described in the previous section of this report, 
insurgents can only be engaged when they are found. Their uses of guerilla 
tactics, commingling in the population, and maintenance of covert infrastructure 
are intended to avoid such a fate. As the model shows, insurgent attrition is a 
function of armed encounters and depends upon the size and effectiveness of 
the counterinsurgent’s armed force as well as the number of insurgents engaged. 
The counterinsurgent faces a different attrition dynamic; since he operates 
largely in the open, he may be subject to attack at the discretion of the insurgent 
and suffers in proportion to the numbers of insurgents and their combat 
effectiveness. 
Figure 6 shows the results of a notional set of encounters between 
insurgents and counterinsurgents at three levels of government combat 
effectiveness. The curves represent relative strength of counterinsurgents versus 
insurgents after each consecutive encounter over time. The winner is the side 
with forces remaining after the other side is reduced to zero strength. In this 
example, conflict begins with the counterinsurgents holding a five-to-one 
advantage in force ratio. As conflict progresses, note that the counterinsurgents 
face a situation of diminishing returns with respect to attacks on insurgents 
(assuming no change in force levels or effective firepower between 
engagements), because there are progressively less people to find, fight, and kill. 
Also observe the relative effect of changes in combat effectiveness on the 
attrition equations in Figure 6: as counterinsurgent effectiveness improves, there 
are more counterinsurgents remaining as the insurgents are defeated; if the 
counterinsurgents are less effective, there are less counterinsurgents left at the 
end of the fight. In this example, the insurgents won due to the 
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Figure 6.   Notional Attrition Model 
Assuming the force ratio remains constant, combat effectiveness has a 
dramatic impact on the outcome of the game and is a critical parameter for each 
side to improve or degrade. Later discussions in this report will address 
components of this parameter and strategies to affect it. Force levels do indeed 
matter, but it is presumably much harder to change that parameter given the 
resource constraints of either the insurgents or counterinsurgents at the onset of 
conflict; the integrated insurgency model to be discussed shortly will account for 
some of this dynamic. 
Since it is obvious that combat effectiveness has a profound effect on the 
ability to attrit the enemy, the topic deserves further examination. The attrition 
model [B] in Figure 4 denotes combat effectiveness by the parameters m and n 
for the counterinsurgents and insurgents respectively. Combat effectiveness can 
be simplified and assumed to be a constant for gross conceptual visualization 
purposes, but in reality it is a complex variable that represents many factors, 
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such as: sophistication of weapons employed; level of training and proficiency of 
soldiers; amount, accuracy and timeliness of intelligence; and the efficiency of 
command and control. Some of these factors are structurally defined due to the 
limits of resources, just as overall force levels are. For example, in the case of 
Nepal, army soldiers equipped with fifty-year old bolt-action Lee-Enfield .303 
rifles can only fire so fast and with so much accuracy, regardless of how good 
their intelligence is. Despite such structural constraints on firepower, a 
counterinsurgent force still has considerable opportunity to improve combat 
effectiveness through better intelligence and command & control capabilities; 
counterinsurgents may also degrade insurgents’ effectiveness through various 
information delay, disruption and denial strategies. 
To examine the impact of information on the dynamics of attrition, 
consider the parameters m’ and n’ in model [C] of Figure 4. As McCormick and 
Giordano indicate, these parameters can be expressed as functions of 
information over time and the ratio of q to r (counterinsurgent’s ability to “see” the 
insurgent compared to the insurgent’s ability to “see” the counterinsurgent).15 If 
either player is able to influence the ratio of q to r, either by improving his 
detection capability or decreasing that of the enemy, it can have a dramatic effect 
on the conflict dynamics (shown notionally in Figure 7). Manipulation of the 
information ratio, independent of other factors, is therefore a very promising 
strategy to affect attrition rates. 
As discussed earlier, mobilization and attrition are simultaneous 
processes in insurgent warfare. To examine how one dynamic influences the 
other, one must consider the equations of model [C] in Figure 4. The framework 
for the game is structurally set by certain initial conditions of the battlespace: 
opening force levels and organizational resources; distribution of political support 
in terms of hard-core followers and the undecided population; and type, 
condition, and skill of armed elements. For either insurgent or counterinsurgent 
system to gain strength or at least outlast the enemy, the combatant must 
                                            
15 McCormick and Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” 18. 
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obviously produce more recruits than it loses in combat or draw down the enemy 
strength faster than the enemy inflicts losses upon it.  
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Figure 7.   Effects of Information on Attrition 
To these ends, there are several potential offensive or defensive 
strategies to influence the variables of recruitment and combat effectiveness. 
Figure 8 shows the impact of various levels of recruitment and combat 
effectiveness on the dynamics of conflict; in this case the two sides begin the 
fight at a hypothetical force ratio of five-to-one in favor of the counterinsurgents. 
Clearly, strong mobilization and tactical denial methods stand out as central 
strategies for insurgents to counter the initial material advantage enjoyed by the 
government. Counterinsurgents should aim to increase their ability to find and kill 
the adversary and/or reduce the recruiting ability of the insurgents to capitalize 
on the state’s initial numerical superiority. 
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Combined Mobilization & Attrition Model










































Figure 8.   Combined Mobilization & Attrition Model 
By no means are the examples presented in Figure 8 totally inclusive of 
the range of strategies and possible outcomes of insurgent conflict, however they 
should give one a sense of the nature of the dynamics one faces in insurgency. 
Further, the graphs thus far only reflect initial conditions, initial moves, and static 
growth and combat effectiveness parameters. The outcome and the manner of 
waging actual combat may lead to more complex and compound effects on these 
dynamics. For instance, a brutal and indiscriminate attack by counterinsurgents 
on rebel targets intermixed with civilians may very well kill a few combatants, but 
it may boost insurgent recruitment or at least reduce the appeal of the 
counterinsurgent; further, if people switch allegiances, precious intelligence on 
the insurgents may dry up and result in even less effective combat effectiveness 
in future engagements. Likewise, if one side is enjoying particular success, 
undecided people may jump on the ‘bandwagon’ and boost recruitment—the 
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notion of ‘success breeding success.’ One cannot possibly identify every 
compound effect embedded in the dynamics and parameters of the insurgency 
model, but it suffices to mark this point for further evaluation in real world 
scenarios as a potential consequence or benefit of the strategies and tactics 
chosen to fight insurgencies.  
A wise military planner seeks to measure the status of forces and 
underlying trends as combat progresses, so as to postulate effective mid-course 
corrections that may either hasten victory or fend off defeat. With the 
mathematical framework presented here, one can track such trends and 
experiment with strategies to see what might be effective in achieving goals. 
Figure 9 presents a few notional combat scenarios where one player realizes 
events are not going his way, so he adjusts his strategies. 
Combined Mobilization & Attrition Model
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Figure 9.   Mid-Course Correction Strategies 
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Note the power of recruitment for the insurgents, as they fight to a 
stalemate after adjusting their mobilization strategy in the face of a highly 
combat-effective counterinsurgent force. Also observe the dramatic effects 
achieved by improving the counterinsurgents’ kill capability. Finally, note that 
even a significant addition of combat forces cannot overcome a well-oiled 
insurgent mobilization. These are simply notional examples of how such moves 
affect the dynamics of insurgent conflict, and of course, either side in the fight 
may use these strategies. 
3. Assessment & Implications of the Models 
The conceptual and mathematical models presented in the prior sections 
should be understood as simplified but useful representations of the systems and 
underlying dynamics involved in insurgent conflict. To be usable in an analysis of 
a real-world situation, however, one must pause to reflect on the meaning and 
implications of the models and then identify the information and intelligence 
assessments needed to calibrate the systems and variables in play. 
Looking first at mobilization, its pace and limits are clearly influenced by 
three factors: the pool of potential recruits, the number of recruiters, and the rate 
at which the organization can transform a recruit into an active member. 
Identification of the number of people supporting each side of the fight, and the 
degree of support and commitment offered by these supporters, is a primary 
intelligence need in order to calibrate mobilization. Several related questions 
must be investigated to calibrate these variables. First, how many people are 
hard core supporters (for either side) and how many in the middle will lean either 
way based on circumstances? Further, what factors drive a potential recruit’s 
choice, i.e., what are the expected costs and benefits of supporting one of the 
sides? This implies the need for a thorough evaluation of the political, social, 
economic, and cultural conditions facing the population, and assessment of the 
population’s likely response to proposed incentives or threats. It also points to the 
need for assessment of the respective players’ willingness and capabilities to 
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deliver on promises or threats. Intelligence on changes in recruitment and level of 
support is essential to gauge each side’s overall rate of growth or decline. 
Identification of the number, methods, and effectiveness of recruiters is 
the second intelligence need in order to calibrate mobilization. The only way to 
grow is to recruit people to one side versus the other; this is an active process 
that requires people to carry the message and lead the recruit into the 
organization. The number of recruiters is important because it represents 
resources dedicated to the task (and not others, such as combat), and may 
indicate the status and reach of either side in the fight. One also needs to know 
what methods recruiters are using, and which methods are working or not, as this 
knowledge is essential to forming countering strategies to either derail the 
opponent’s efforts or to enhance one’s own recruitment efforts. 
Assessment of the ability of the insurgent or counterinsurgent force to 
transform recruit into active member is the final intelligence need to calibrate 
mobilization. To be effective, the organization must be able to accommodate and 
employ growing numbers of recruits. If the organization cannot provide such 
support, it will reach a point of diminishing returns in recruitment. In the case of 
insurgents, this concept highlights the downside of growth: increasing numbers of 
recruits raises its organizational signature, and strains the insurgency’s ability to 
remain clandestine. In the case of the counterinsurgent, this concept highlights 
the importance of the state’s ability to effectively secure and control people and 
territory. Intelligence in this area should target indicators such as organizational 
capacity, training, logistics readiness, and operational security, as a measure of 
the level of institutional development. It is clear why most experts agree that 
identification of the insurgent’s infrastructure is the critical intelligence need in 
counterinsurgency, as it reduces the insurgent’s primary advantage. The 
counterinsurgents must be able to grow and sustain its capabilities from a highly 
exposed position, thus they must focus efforts on minimizing the insurgent’s 
knowledge of, and ability to act on, the state’s critical operational information.  
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As noted previously, the other component of the calculus of insurgency 
deals with attrition, or the ability to survive in the face of direct armed 
engagement with the opponent. This is the most “conventional” aspect of 
insurgency, in that damage or survival of either side appears to be directly 
calculable: “if ‘a’ shoots ‘b’ with lethality ‘c’ and accuracy ‘d’, then ‘e’ will occur.” 
Even this simple calculation gets twisted in insurgency, however, due to the 
relative information superiority held by the insurgents. Since the insurgents 
remain hidden, at least in the early stages of conflict, the state does not know 
where and when to apply its combat power—it is weapon rich and target poor. 
The state can only win when it finds the insurgents. Conversely, since the state 
generally must operate from known and publicized areas, the insurgent can 
attack at the time and location of his choosing and inflict as much damage as his 
weapons allow. The intelligence dilemma of the state on the attrition side of 
insurgency calculus is stark: knowledge of the identity and location of the 
insurgent is most important and useful, but it is least available. Basic military 
intelligence on the nature, skill, and effectiveness of insurgent combat forces and 
on the battlefield environment remains essential to determining “how” to engage 
forces when and where an opportunity arises. But, the state must first gain 
intelligence on the identity and movements of insurgents in order to attack them. 
Discrete success in each component of the insurgency equation is 
required to win the game, but components of the calculus also interact 
dynamically. This attribute of insurgency leads to sometimes contradictory and 
counterproductive results—whereby one side’s gains may produce even higher 
gains for the other side. For example, indiscriminate state reprisal against a 
minor insurgent act may inflict significant collateral damage on the population 
that the state is supposedly protecting. In this case, the insurgent may gain 
recruits from the afflicted population; as a minimum, the lack of discrimination 
may weaken popular or external support to the state. Thus the mobilization 
equation can be affected by attrition results, and vice versa, since improved 
mobilization of the other side would tend to reduce information or other resources 
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that are necessary to attrit the adversary. This factor of insurgency implies that 
adequate intelligence on relevant variables and assessment of the likely 
consequences of specific actions are absolutely critical to properly calibrate the 
selection, timing, and execution of counterinsurgency strategies.  
A final observation on the insurgency models is that the strength and 
status of an insurgency may vary across various zones of conflict within a 
country, reflecting a host of structural or dynamic variables linked to diverse local 
conditions. While intelligence needs are consistent among all areas of conflict, 
assessments may vary widely between each area. One must take care not to 
overly generalize local observations across the theater of operations. It is 
possible, and likely, that intelligence on one area will lead to a counterinsurgency 
strategy tailored for the conditions of that area, but the same strategy or timing of 
an operation may not be appropriate for a different area. Intelligence must be 
broad enough to cover all areas of operations, but precise enough to discern 
differences from one area to the next. 
4. Priority Information Requirements  
The framework proposed in this thesis implies a wide array of information 
and intelligence needs that must be met to effectively model, analyze, and 
conduct counterinsurgency. The models provide a sensible context in which one 
may place information regarding the players, the battleground, and the 
underlying dynamics of the insurgency; moreover, the models provide a means 
to evaluate alternative strategies and tactics before committing to them in the 
field. Successful application of these tools in the real world, however, demands 
accurate intelligence on the variables McCormick and Giordano identify.  
This paper proposes the set of priority information requirements listed in 
Table 1 be researched in order to adequately characterize the structure and 
dynamics of the conflict ongoing in Nepal. By no means is this list exhaustive, but 
an effective counterinsurgency strategy for Nepal depends on information and 





Geography / topography / climatology 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
Dominant features, constraints and concerns 
relevant to strategic, operational and tactical ops 
Demographics / ethnography / culture 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
 
Characterize local population base 
Popular strata by meaningful criteria 
Prevailing attitudes, needs, desires 
Topical or historical sensitivities 
Languages, dialects spoken 
Religions practiced 
Economic / social factors 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
Levels and sources of income 
Economic growth / decline rates 
Health and sanitary conditions, treatment facilities 
Political / governmental situation 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 




Districts / zones / villages 
Transportation networks 
Power generation & distribution networks 
Water treatment & distribution networks 
The State (Counterinsurgent forces) 
Subject Remarks 
Combat forces (military and/or paramilitary) Effective combat strength: number of deployable 
personnel 
Effective combat power: number and type of 
weapons, level of readiness and proficiency 
Deployment locations and status 
Mobility 
Current operational activity 
Infrastructure 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
Police & law enforcement 
Intelligence and information collection, 
processing, and analysis 
Communications capabilities 
Logistics capacity and readiness  
Governmental / administrative capabilities 
Mass-media / information dissemination 
Current operational activity 
External support Source, type, amount, frequency of support 
Delivery mechanism 
Current activity 
The Counter-State (Insurgent forces) 
Subject Remarks 
Combat forces Effective combat strength: number of deployable 
personnel 
Effective combat power: number and type of 
weapons, level of readiness and proficiency 
Deployment locations and status 
Mobility 





Districts / zones / villages 
Number / location of Cadres 
Intelligence and information collection, 
processing, and analysis 
Communications capabilities 
Logistics capacity and readiness  
Administrative capabilities 
Mass-media / information dissemination 
Current operational activity 
External support Source, type, amount, frequency of support 
Delivery mechanism 
Current activity 
Target Population (decided and undecided supporters) 
Subject Remarks 
Disposition of population 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
Nature of support tendered 
Political inclinations / natural preferences 
Perceived level of security & prosperity 





Districts / zones / villages 
Number / fraction of hard core supporters 
Number / fraction of “swing” recruits 
Number of recruiters 
Recruitment methods: promises / threats made 
Capacity to absorb and employ recruits 
Periodic growth, change in support level 
Insurgent growth 
National 
Districts / zones / villages 
Number / fraction of hard core supporters 
Number / fraction of “swing” recruits 
Number of recruiters 
Recruitment methods: promises / threats made 
Capacity to absorb and employ recruits 
Periodic growth, change in support level 
Attrition 
Subject Remarks 
Counterinsurgent forces Engagements initiated vs. induced 
Weapons & combat effectiveness: exchange 
ratios, accuracy, kills, losses 
Survival rates 
Insurgents Engagements initiated vs. induced 
Weapons & combat effectiveness: exchange 
ratios, accuracy, kills, losses 
Survival rates 
Table 1.   Priority Information Requirements for Analysis of Insurgency 
The breadth and depth of information and intelligence needs listed above 
poses a tremendous challenge for the world’s most sophisticated and resource-
rich states, let alone a developing and poor nation such as Nepal. If progress is 
to be made in counterinsurgency, however, leaders need to realize the profound 
importance of spending resources and conducting operations simply to gain 
information that will help define the systems in play and shape effective strategy. 
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C. CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN NEPAL 
The next task of this analysis is to populate the insurgency models with 
available information, using the conceptual and mathematical framework 
described in the previous sections as a contextual map of the battlespace in 
Nepal. It should be noted that there are many facts for which there are few 
published or reliable sources in Nepal, short of in-country village-level research. 
In these cases, gaps in data often tell a larger tale as they point to weaknesses 
of access, capabilities, or priorities on the part of the counterinsurgent. 
Most people, if they have any impression of Nepal at all, probably imagine 
it to be a land of rugged natural beauty inhabited by a seemingly harmonious 
people living in the world’s only Hindu kingdom. While some of these notions 
have a vein of truth to them, author Michael Hutt shatters these images as he 
describes Nepal not as a land in harmony, rather as a land filled with stark 
contrasts and contradictions including the following:16 
• A Hindu state vs. the presence of significant religious minorities 
• A unitary state with one official language vs. the presence of scores 
of different ethnic groups speaking dozens of different languages 
• A most-aided nation vs. an impoverished population 
• A multi-party democracy under a constitutional monarchy vs. an 
entrenched communist insurgency 
• A land of peace vs. a place of brutal violence at many times in 
Nepal’s history 
1. Basic Facts 
Nepal is certainly a land of physical contrasts, a fact that creates or 
enhances other contrasts in its society, economy, and politics. Nepal’s 
geography, environment, and climate profoundly influenced its historical 
development and largely shape its limits and opportunities to this date. Nepal is a 
                                            
16 Michael Hutt, ed., Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 1-2. 
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small landlocked nation that is geostrategically positioned (Figure 10) between 
the two giants of China and India. It has a land area of about 150,000 square 
kilometers, roughly the size and shape of Tennessee.17 Nepal’s terrain ranges 
from low-lying jungles and farmland (known as the Terai) along the southern 
border with India, to terraced and forested central hills, to majestic Himalayan 
peaks along the northern border with China. Climate ranges from subtropical in 
the south to temperate in the middle hills to near arctic cold in the North. Nepal is 
affected by seasonal monsoons just as most of South Asia; depending on the 
timing and severity of the storms, floods, landslides, drought or famine are 
frequent consequences. 
 
Figure 10.   Nepal’s Geostrategic Position18 
                                            
17 US Department of State. “Background Note: Nepal.” Bureau of South Asian Affairs. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.htm.  
18 Images adapted from: Canadian Consular Affairs, South Asia, available from  
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/Images/az/maps/cont/south_asia-fr_big.gif; and US Department of 
State, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, available from http://www.state.gov/p/sa/ci/np. 
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What is most striking about the physical environment of Nepal is how its 
topography influences life there at national and individual levels. The Himalayas 
form a natural protective barrier to the north, and the once-impenetrable jungles 
of the Terai deterred incursion from the South.19 While the international isolation 
induced by these features has been reduced somewhat over time, Nepal’s 
topography also isolates the people in various pockets of land within the 
country—a feature that has not yet been overcome. The pockmarked central hills 
lend themselves to “micro-cultures” with various ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
roots; further, rugged terrain reduces lines of communications to just a few north-
south and east-west routes.20 This feature makes it very difficult to develop 
industry, agriculture, or physical infrastructure to reach and service people in 
remote areas. It is no coincidence that this is the region in which the Maoist 
insurgency bloomed, which will be discussed shortly. 
Nepal’s population is often presented as diverse but united under the 
Hindu monarchy. Table 2 presents Nepal’s key demographics; these statistics 
certainly reinforce the notion of diversity, but also point to the roots of many of 
Nepal’s problems. Nepal is more a mosaic than a melting pot, comprised of tiny 
societies bound through a variety of castes under the banner of the Kingdom of 
Nepal. Ostensibly, the Hindu caste system provides structure to Nepali society 
and a sense of “natural law” among its peoples. Hinduism in theory does not see 
this as discrimination; rather, it is an ordering of roles and duties in life. As with all 
religions, however, theory and practice can stray wildly. While caste 
discrimination is constitutionally illegal, inequities in distribution of public goods 
and structural limits to one’s potential are facts of life that bound the prospects for 
a large part of Nepali society. Furthermore, such practices fuel perceptions of a 
feudal and anachronistic society that is out of step with modern needs and 
practices. 
                                            
19 Leo Rose and John Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1980), 2. 
20 Ibid, 3. 
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D e m o g ra p h ic N o te s
P o p u la tio n  (2 0 0 4 ) 2 4 .8  m illio n
A n n u a l p o p u la tio n  g ro w th 2 .2 5 %
P o p u la tio n  d is tr ib u tio n  R u ra l (8 5 .8 % );  U rb a n  (1 4 .2 % )
E th n ic  g ro u p s
C a s te s B ra h m a n , C h e tr i,  N e w a r , G u ru n g , M a g a r , 
T a m a n g , R a i, L im b u , S h e rp a , T h a ru , a n d  
o th e rs
E th n ic ity “ C a s te ”  (5 6 .2 % );  “ E th n ic s ”  (3 5 .5 % );  
“ O th e rs ”  (8 .3 % ) 
L a n g u a g e s N e p a li a n d  1 8  o th e rs
R e lig io n s H in d u is m  (8 0 .6 % ), B u d d h is m  (1 0 .7 % ), 
Is la m  (4 .2 % ), a n d  o th e rs  (4 .2 % )
E d u c a tio n  
A tte n d a n c e P r im a ry  8 0 .4 % , S e c o n d a ry  2 0 %
L ite ra c y 5 3 .7 %  (6 5 .1 %  m a le , 4 2 .5 %  fe m a le ), 
lo w e r  in  ru ra l a re a s
H e a lth
In fa n t m o r ta lity  ra te 6 4 .2 /1 ,0 0 0
L ife  e x p e c ta n c y 5 8 .3  y rs  (m a le ), 4 2 .5  y rs  (fe m a le )
W o rk  fo rc e A g r ic u ltu re  (8 5 % );  in d u s try  (3 % );  
s e rv ic e s  (1 1 % );  o th e r  (1 % )  
Table 2.   Nepal’s Key Demographics21 
Nepal is also an extremely poor nation with bleak economic prospects. 
Per-capita income is only $279 (2004), somewhat higher in the urban areas and 
lowest in the rural areas and among the lower castes and ethnics; nearly 38% of 
the population lives in poverty.22 Agriculture is Nepal’s economic mainstay; it 
provides 39% of GDP and employs 85% of the population.23 Nepal’s total GDP 
measures $5.82 billion with 2.6% growth in 2003, but forecasted to contract 1.6% 
in 2005.24 The work force is about 10 million, has high unemployment, and 
severely lacks skills. There are few natural resources, few industries, and few 
exports; even these are routinely threatened by insurgent attacks. Remittances 
from Nepalis working in foreign countries, including Gurkha soldiers and common 
laborers, and foreign aid provide critical influxes of hard currency; U.S. 
                                            





assistance alone totaled more than $791 million since 1951, and currently 
averages about $40 million per year.25 
As noted previously, topography largely determines the extent and nature 
of Nepal’s infrastructure, which further compounds its economic woes. There is 
extremely limited ground and air transportation, and most rural villages in the hill 
districts are only accessible by foot. Telecommunications and electronic media 
include land and wireless phones, FM radio, television, and Internet; services are 
available mainly in the urban centers and are heavily regulated by the 
government. Nepal has vast water resources due to the drainage from the 
Himalayan snows and monsoonal rains, but there are limited processing and 
distribution capabilities to provide drinking, sanitation, and agricultural supplies to 
anywhere but the capital and district centers. Only one-third of Nepal’s population 
has access to electrical power, and most of that is concentrated in urban areas; 
and despite the vast hydroelectric potential of its rivers, only 1% of it is tapped.26 
In all cases, therefore, services are mainly limited to the urban areas; most of the 
rural areas, and especially those in the west and central hills, remain isolated. 
The limits of Nepal’s infrastructures are not due to lack of effort, as hundreds of 
millions of foreign dollars have paid for projects to extend services to the rural 
poor; but, corrupt officials and insurgent attacks routinely wreck havoc on 
development efforts through pilferage or destruction respectively.  
To complete the basic understanding of Nepal today, one must also 
consider its political and governmental situation. ‘Fragile’ may be too mild a 
description for it; ‘chaos’ may be closer to the mark. From Nepal’s founding as a 
nation state in 1768 up to 1990, the country was ruled by either an absolute 
monarch or a party-less and autocratic oligarchy. Mounting internal pressure for 
democratic government, which was fueled by similar contemporary movements 
elsewhere in the world, brought Nepal to its first constitutional crisis in 1990. At 
that time, the political parties and mass protests by Nepali citizens forced King 
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Birendra to terminate his party-less form of government and adopt a new 
constitution. The 1990 constitution reframed Nepal as a constitutional monarchy, 
in which a multi-party democratic parliament would administer the country and 
share certain state responsibilities with the monarchy.  
Since 1990, the nascent democracy had numerous growing pains and 
outright failures. Parties formed coalitions, argued over priorities and policies, 
and then fractured again. Some 12 governments were formed and failed within 
10 years, giving the people an impression that politicians were only interested in 
power plays and obtaining wealth before being ousted by a new power.27 Twelve 
years of parliamentary rule did little to improve lives of Nepalis, but did result in 
bloated bureaucracy, corruption, and wider economic and social gaps between 
the various castes and ethnic populations.28 Simply, average citizens were left 
behind and fissures grew between all elements of Nepali society. It was in this 
climate of political chaos that the communists, especially the radical leftists—the 
Maoists—ascended in February 1996 to take up the cause of the people. As the 
Maoists expanded their influence and reign of terror, the government’s 
administrative elements were rendered ineffective, and most were withdrawn 
from rural areas to the more defendable district centers.29 
In June 2001, Nepal witnessed an unprecedented royal massacre at the 
hands of Crown Prince Dipendra, who killed nearly all of the royal family, and 
then turned his gun on himself. The only survivor was the king’s brother 
Gyanendra, who was away at the time and thus assumed the throne. Since his 
first days on the throne, King Gyanendra has been embattled with both the 
politicians and the Maoists. Gyanendra clearly envisions an active role for the 
monarchy in Nepal’s administration, and detests the Maoists’ call for abolition of 
the monarchy. Whether this vision comes from a Hindu sense of dharma (duty) 
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as divine ruler of the country, or from a cynical motive to restore the power and 
prestige of the monarchy, is a point of much debate within Nepal.  
Whatever his motive, King Gyanendra quickly established himself as a 
political force by invoking emergency powers granted to the monarch by the 
constitution. He blamed the political parties and their successively weaker 
administrations for failing to suppress the Maoist insurgency and for weakening 
the social and economic state of the country. He dismissed the Parliament and 
the Prime Minister in October 2002, initiating a cycle of emergency declarations, 
direct administrative appointments, and eventual dismissals of the very same 
administrators. King Gyanendra initiated the most recent political crisis when he 
dismissed the coalition government in February 2005, and then assumed direct 
control of the government under the auspices of emergency powers. 
In summary, Nepal is a country in dire straits. It faces mounting cultural, 
social, economic, political, and security challenges; unfortunately, Nepal is ill 
equipped to deal with such problems—even if the country could form a cohesive 
and unified political strategy to do so. A combination of poor infrastructure, few 
resources, weak political mechanisms, and little experience make it especially 
hard for Nepal to effectively addressing modern problems in a modern way, and 
to simultaneously counter the raging Maoist insurgency.  
2. The State 
The previous section outlined basic physical, social, economic, and 
political factors that shape the conflict environment in Nepal. This section drills 
deeper into the counterinsurgency model to illuminate the state apparatus of 
Nepal as one of the two contestants in the conflict there. Conceptually, the ‘state’ 
refers not only to the regime, but also to security forces, intelligence resources, 
national and village level officials, and links to foreign support. In the McCormick 
insurgency model, the state is envisioned as a unitary actor. It should be clear 
from the discussion in the previous section of this paper that Nepal does not 
satisfy this presumption in the present day; in-fighting between the monarchy and 
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political parties, and animosity among security forces hinder the state’s response 
to the Maoists’ challenge. 
Assuming for the moment—admittedly a big assumption—that political 
fissures within the government can be resolved, one still faces the challenges of 
mobilizing popular support, gaining resources, and ultimately defeating the 
Maoists. Three distinct state security elements are employed in the conflict: the 
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), the Armed Police Force (APF), and the Nepal 
Police (NP). Historically, there was little interaction and much distrust among 
these elements; hence, from the inception of the insurgency until very recently, 
there was little of what the U.S. military would consider joint operations with 
respect to the Maoists.  
The RNA’s traditional and primary mission is to guard the royal family and 
defend its interests.30  In addition, the RNA has routinely deployed to support 
United Nations peacekeeping missions in various hot spots around the globe. In 
all cases, Nepal’s constitution specifies that the RNA can be mobilized only after 
the king’s approval (the king is the Supreme Commander of the RNA) on the 
recommendations presented by the National Security Council (NSC).31 The NSC 
is comprised of the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of Army 
Staff.32 As the Defense Minister and Chief of Army Staff are appointed by and 
presumably owe primary allegiance to the king, it is not hard to imagine the 
reluctance and fear felt by the parliamentary forces in the matter of employing the 
RNA in counterinsurgency operations. Parliament’s reluctance to work with the 
RNA explains why the civilian Nepal Police was initially deployed instead to 
counter the Maoists; when the police were clearly overmatched, Parliament 
established and employed the Armed Police Force. 
Following King Gyanendra’s first declaration of emergency in November 
2001, he authorized the RNA to directly enter the conflict and engage the 
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Maoists offensively for the first time. At least initially, the RNA was poorly trained 
and equipped for counterinsurgency, and it continuously faces allegations of 
human rights violations. The RNA currently consists of about 85,000 personnel 
organized into six divisions dispersed in the country (Far Western, Mid Western, 
Western, Central, Eastern, and the Valley Division) plus separate Aviation, 
Parachute, and Royal Palace Brigades centered in Kathmandu.33 Plans are in 
place for the force to grow to 150,000 troops by 2015.34 By the RNA’s own 
account, however, only about 60% of the force is available to commit to the 
counterinsurgency as the remaining troops are dedicated to static security duties 
such as protecting government offices, barracks and infrastructures.35 
The RNA’s equipment consists of a small number of armored vehicles and 
personnel carriers, a few artillery pieces, thousands of small arms, and a handful 
of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft of questionable readiness.36 Due to Nepal’s 
difficult topography and limited infrastructure, the RNA is forced to operate from 
garrison in the larger regional headquarters, using temporary foot and helicopter-
assisted patrols to reach the more isolated rural areas. All of this plays into the 
hands of the guerrilla adversary, to be discussed shortly. 
In addition to the now prominent forces of the RNA, the state employs the 
Armed Police Force and the Nepal Police to fight the Maoists. The APF numbers 
about 7,000 troops armed with light infantry weapons, but is considered to be 
poorly trained and has been accused of perpetrating widespread human rights 
abuses, including extrajudicial killings.37 The 46,000 strong Nepal Police was 
brought under unified command with the Army in 2003, although there is 
considerable debate about the level of unity between the security forces. The 
primary roles of the NP now are to provide security to local people and property, 
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to provide security for regional administrative centers, and to contain civil unrest 
in major urban centers.38 
Another security element that plays an important, but sometimes 
unpredictable and even counterproductive, role is the village self-defense force. 
Such local militias receive at least tacit support from the government, and some 
claim to have received training and encouragement by the Army.39 In some 
cases the militias provide an effective deterrent to Maoist extortion, recruitment, 
or abductions. But, they have also been misused as instruments of revenge or 
advantage in affairs unrelated to Maoist activities, and there is a tendency to 
commit counter-atrocities following Maoist attacks. There is no formal count of 
the number of local militias nor is there anything that resembles state-wide 
command and control of these units as part of an integrated national 
counterinsurgency strategy. Thomas Marks, a prominent U.S. counterinsurgency 
expert, points to the potential of local security forces as the best way to improve 
the situation in Nepal,40 but clearly there must be a mechanism to regulate and 
harness this capability as a positive tool. 
An additional critical component of the state’s counterinsurgency system is 
intelligence. Most analysts agree that Nepal’s state intelligence apparatus is 
woefully inadequate to meet the demands of counterinsurgency. Thomas Marks 
notes that the RNA, APF, NP and the National Investigation Department are 
generally weak in gathering, exploiting, and disseminating information; 
furthermore, the organizations act as separate entities with little coordination or 
data sharing except at the highest levels of the organizations.41 These problems, 
which understandably stem from historic separation of civil and military functions, 
must be addressed in order to make progress in the counterinsurgency. No 
where is the problem more acute than in the area of village-level human 
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intelligence on Maoist activities—precisely where the state most needs 
intelligence collection, fusion, and sharing. Another challenge is centralization of 
intelligence in Kathmandu, due to limited technical and human means and 
accesses to penetrate isolated rural villages that are ethnically and linguistically 
distinct from government forces.42 
Nepal’s counterinsurgency system also includes its administrative 
infrastructure. The administration is the government’s ‘face’ to the general public, 
responsible for delivering public goods and services, maintaining physical 
infrastructure, collecting revenues, and providing judicial review where needed. 
As shown in Figure 12, Nepal is divided administratively into 5 development 
regions, 14 administrative zones, 75 administrative districts, 3,913 Village 
Development Committees (VDC), and 58 Municipalities in the country (a VDC 
consists of 9 wards and the Municipalities consist from 9 to 35 wards).43 
Although the situation on the ground is fluid, the security forces and the Maoists 
each claim to have freedom of movement and at least temporary occupation in 
all 75 districts. Poor security, however, forced most administrative elements to 
withdraw from rural areas into more defendable positions in district 
headquarters44—thus leaving a vacuum of power and desperately needed 
services at the village level. In the wake of the government’s departure, the 
Maoists have moved into several areas to establish de facto control and largely 
render the government administration impotent in providing security and all the 
other services listed above. 
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Figure 11.   Nepal’s Administrative Areas45 
Due to Nepal’s intense internal problems and limited resources, it is forced 
to draw upon external support to fight the insurgency and to resolve the conflict’s 
root causes. Nepal desperately needs military hardware, foreign aid for 
development projects, and investment for economic growth; assistance, 
however, often comes with political strings attached and is subject to suspension 
or termination as conditions within Nepal change. King Gyanendra’s assumption 
of power in February 2005, and his subsequent suppression of civil liberties and 
democratic instruments, dealt a huge blow to foreign support. With the exception 
of China and Pakistan, who maintain that Nepal’s political crisis is an internal 
matter, foreign support has substantially decreased in the months since the royal 
takeover. 
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Exogenous support comes in various means and quantities. China is a 
significant source of capital investment and development aid in the areas of 
technology, medicine, and physical infrastructure; Pakistan has offered material 
support, but as yet Nepal has not accepted.46 The bulk of Nepal’s external 
military and monetary aid comes from India, followed by the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal has direct and serious implications for 
the internal security of parts of northern India, which explains why India is the 
largest supplier of security assistance to Nepal. India is the primary source of 
rifles, ammunition, armored vehicles, and aircraft; it also supplies technical 
training and assistance in a host of military functions.47 Since 2001, the U.S. has 
provided light weaponry, night vision goggles, body armor, secure 
communications, spare parts, and training to the RNA.48 The U.S. has provided 
nearly $200 million in all forms of aid from FY2001 through FY2005.49 The U.K. 
has supplied helicopters, armored vehicles, and counterinsurgency advisors.50 
As mentioned above, virtually all military and development aid were suspended 
or placed under review since February 2005; full resumption of aid to Nepal is 
contingent upon restoration of civil rights and multi-party democracy. 
In summary, Nepal’s state apparatus for countering the Maoist insurgency 
is severely challenged in almost every aspect. Nepal’s fundamental limitations 
are security, political unity, and resources. Progressive improvement in critical 
capabilities appears possible given adequate internal attention and generous 
foreign support, but fissures between the monarchy and politicians must be 
resolved. The two entities must then turn their attentions towards the security 
situation in Nepal. 
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3. The Counterstate 
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) did not suddenly erupt 
overnight; it grew out of the splinter groups of the political left in the decades prior 
to 1990, and surfaced following the introduction of multi-party democracy. As the 
original cadre became more disillusioned by the mainstream parties’ ignorance of 
social issues and perceived profiteering at the expense of average people, its 
rhetoric became increasingly radical. The Maoists presented the “people’s 
demands” to the government in 1995; the top concerns include the following:51 
• Elimination of the “feudal” monarchy by forming a republican 
system via constituent assembly 
• Demobilization of armies and formation of a single national 
People’s Army 
• Conduct of free and fair elections under the supervision of United 
Nations and international agencies 
• Revision of the Constitution in order to redress historic inequities in 
political, economic, social and foreign affairs 
• Implement a host of reforms in domestic and international affairs, 
such as establishing Nepal as a secular socialist state and 
disengaging from imperialistic treaties with India and other nations 
The demands of the party were largely ignored or otherwise dismissed by 
the parties in power. Seeing no other alternative to achieve their goals, CPN-M 
initiated armed revolutionary struggle in Feb 1996 using Mao’s “People’s War” 
philosophy. The Maoists are led by Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka 
Prachanda), chief ideologue and negotiator Baburam Bhattarai, and chief military 
strategist Ram Bahadur Thapa (aka Badal).52 The makeup of Maoist leadership 
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presents yet another bizarre contradiction within Nepal, which remains untapped 
as a potential source of dissention in Maoist ranks; as Prakash Raj notes:  
The paradox of the whole exercise was the fact that two Brahmin 
Maoist leaders [Prachanda and Baburam] were leading a 
movement demanding that Nepal be declared a secular state. On 
the other hand, the movement whose leading military strategist 
[Badal] was a Magar, an ethnic group that supplied the largest 
number of Gurkha soldiers to both British and the Indian armies 
was also demanding that Gurkha recruiting centers in Nepal be 
closed.53  
In line with traditional communist approaches, the Maoists use three 
instruments to pursue their revolutionary goals: the Party, the People’s Army, and 
the United Front.54 Party authority is centralized in the Politburo as the senior 
decision making body. Operations are organized into five regional units (Eastern, 
Central, Western, Kathmandu, and Abroad), each with three sub-regional 
bureaus and multiple smaller layers of administration.55 All critical policies 
concerning the People’s War are designed by the central committee of the 
Politburo and executed through the various bureaus. Strong political 
centralization likely explains how potentially divergent or harmful ideas are swiftly 
checked. Structurally, the uniformed People’s Army and the non-uniformed 
village militias provide the means to achieve the goal of destroying the ‘old’ 
state’s forces; more details on these capabilities will be discussed shortly. Finally, 
the Maoists envision a united front of broad-based mass support as a primary 
instrument of state power.56 Objective membership of the united front includes 
workers, peasants, ethnics, and oppressed castes; taken together, this collection 
represents nearly all marginalized groups in Nepali society. 
The cohesion and focus of the Maoists’ political instrument is a 
tremendous strength in its struggle to gain power in Nepal. The rapid growth and 
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development of the People’s Army is equally impressive and important. The 
Army’s tactical operations—successes or failures—cost the state in material 
ways and through diminishing perceptions of strength or legitimacy. As Deepak 
Thapa puts it, “the Maoists grew from a handful of would-be guerrillas, which 
started out with just two rifles (one of which did not work) to a force of thousands 
of troops armed with self-loading rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers.”57  
Today, the weapons of choice add to the above list such items as land mines, 
‘socket bombs’, and ‘pressure-cooker’ bombs; these are all Maoist versions of 
improved explosive devices (IEDs), and have caused countless injuries and 
deaths to average citizens as well as security forces. It is nearly impossible to 
find an accurate and consensus estimate of Maoist troop strength due to poor 
state intelligence, but most guesses are in the following ranges: 5,000 to 10,000 
hardcore Maoist fighters; 10,000 to 15,000 militia members; 15,000 to 25,000 
active political cadres; and 100,000 to 150,000 active supporters. 
Maoist military strategy is rational and tactically flexible, and is linked to 
larger political and organizational mobilization plans. The Maoists foresee three 
strategic phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic 
offensive.58 It is important to note that each of these phases may be pursued 
simultaneously in various parts of the country, under direction of the Central 
Committee. Strategic defensive is the initial phase of growth, a period used to 
build forces in order to fight the government; this phase is also directed at gaining 
political control in the remote villages in order to remove local vestiges of the “old 
state”. Activities during the strategic defensive phase include targeted attacks 
against unarmed civilians, robberies and extortion of food or money, and raids on 
government stores for weapons and explosives;59 all of these activities are 
designed to improve the Maoists’ operational capabilities. Maoists also use 
terrorism in this phase for its powerful psychological effect on the targeted 
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population: it demonstrates the Maoists’ local power and the government’s 
unwillingness or inability to challenge them.  
In the second stage of Maoist strategy, the strategic stalemate, Maoists 
launch concentrated attacks against relatively weak elements of the security 
forces. The Maoists use these attacks to attrit the enemy, gain even more 
weapons and supplies, and inflict psychological stress on the population and the 
government forces. Also during this phase, the Maoists establish and expand 
base areas under their political administration. In the absence of the state, 
Maoists implement taxes, education, courts, and security in an effort to increase 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the villagers. In the Maoist base areas, all 
improvement and development must be coordinated through the Maoist 
administration; this factor has led to the destruction of many internationally-
funded infrastructure projects that did not meet with Maoist approval.  
During stalemate, the Maoists selectively enter cease-fire agreements or 
peace negotiations with the government. On the one hand, this tactic allows them 
to appeal to politicians and people who favor a way out of conflict through 
dialogue; on the other hand, the Maoists use the lull in activity to infiltrate areas 
not under their direct control and to rearm their forces. The pattern of cease-fire, 
negotiations, rearmament, and then resumption of hostilities was observed in 
2001, then again in 2003. The cycle may be repeating itself currently in Nepal: in 
June 2005, the Maoists made direct appeals to the seven mainstream political 
parties (but not the King) to enter negotiations; this was followed by Chairman 
Prachanda’s announcement on 3 September 2005 of a unilateral Maoist 
ceasefire for three months, purportedly to facilitate political dialogue with the 
opposition parties.60 Based on previous experiences, one must question whether 
this is a genuine step towards peace, or a calculated move to consolidate 
political support and to martial resources for a final offensive against the King. 
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The final phase of Maoist strategy is the strategic offense. The objective of 
this phase is to take control of the remaining countryside by surrounding the 
cities from the rural areas under Maoist power. This phase is marked by 
increasingly “conventional” conflict between Maoist regular forces and the state 
security forces, where swarms of Maoists troops converge and force the state 
into engagements where they are at a disadvantage. Additionally, the Maoists 
exert pressure against the people and economy of the urban areas during this 
phase through tactics such as transportation blockades, large-scale abductions, 
student or worker strikes, bombings, and targeted assassinations of civil officials. 
Whether the Maoists believe operations to be in the strategic offensive phase 
today is not clear; intense activity since the failed peace negotiations in 2003 has 
certainly raised the possibility. 
As many counterinsurgency experts have noted, one of the primary 
reasons for insurgent growth is their initial intelligence advantage. This dynamic 
holds for the Maoists in Nepal, especially in the isolated rural villages that are the 
primary conflict zones. Expulsion of local officials and security forces from the 
villages to a relatively few regional and district headquarters reduces the 
intelligence burden of the Maoists in at least two significant ways. First, the 
Maoists are able to compel the population to provide information on government 
agents and activities through physical intimidation or actual punishment of the 
people. Second, Maoists are able to freely maneuver in the affected regions and 
may monitor the few approaches from the government’s base areas to those of 
the Maoists, so they know when and with how much strength the government 
approaches them.  
Beyond the tactical level, the Maoists enjoy intelligence advantages at the 
operational and strategic levels as a result of: good communications access; 
sympathetic students, workers, or academics in Nepal or India; and infiltration of 
active Maoist agents into government functions. The Maoists have modern 
communications, mostly outside the government’s control,61 and share 
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information via the Internet. Furthermore, sympathizers provide two-way support 
between the Central Committee and student or labor unions when the Maoists 
call for larger disruptions in civil or economic affairs. Finally, on at least several 
occasions, Maoists in disguise have posed as unemployed youth from the 
conflict zones who garnered low-paying jobs in governmental offices or RNA 
barracks—all the while gathering intelligence on officials and activities.62 In the 
cases where Maoist forces were taken by surprise in the field, there is some 
evidence that it was due to weaknesses in counterintelligence, as villagers with 
ties to political parties or the RNA managed to inform the government of Maoist 
plans with sufficient time for the government to outmaneuver the Maoists.63 
It should be evident at this point that CPN-M represents a homegrown and 
nationalistic movement. While the Maoists draw upon ideological support from 
various Maoist movements in the region and around the world, they remain 
isolated from undue external influence and they are self-sustaining. Maoists gain 
military equipment primarily through theft or capture during engagements with 
state security forces.64 Funding comes mainly through a mix of coercive and 
criminal activities including: 40% extortion from individuals and businesses; 20% 
looting and bank robbery; 25% illegal trade in narcotics; and 15% external 
sources (primarily Nepali diasporas in India and the U.S.).65 The porous border 
with India has also allowed the Maoists to use Indian territory as a safe haven for 
political meetings, training, and assembly of forces. From these sheltered areas, 
the Maoists have built a robust support network supplying trained manpower, 
weapons and finances to mid-western Nepal.66 
The Maoist movement’s growth is a product of its political-military 
cohesiveness, its focused strategy, and the Nepalese government’s ineffective 
response to its challenge. Reportedly, Maoist guerrillas now operate to varying                                             
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degrees in 68 of Nepal’s 75 districts.67 Their influence varies between moderate 
to extreme in these districts. It should be noted, however, that the government 
also claims to have complete freedom of movement in the same areas. 
According to K.P.S. Gill of the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the state’s presence 
in the districts of mid-western Nepal is limited to district headquarters, with the 
rest of each district under Maoist control.68 The insurgency began in the three 
districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot in the mid-western hills, and the area is 
now considered the “Maoist heartland”. The Maoists have developed strong 
bases since then in Western and mid-Western regions, and to a lesser extent, in 
the Eastern region.69 Figure 13 shows the extent of Maoist influence through 
2004, as measured by numbers of internally displaced people in each district. It 
is no coincidence that the insurgency was able to spawn and grow in these 
areas. Particularly in the Western and mid-Western zones, the land could be 
described as a ‘guerrilla heaven’ due to its craggy and steep terrain, heavily 
forested hills, single-track trails, and isolated villages. Coincidently, these are the 
most socially and economically challenged areas of Nepal. 
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Figure 12.   Maoist Affected Areas (2001-2004)70 
 
4. The Target Population 
It should be clear from the earlier discussion of Nepal’s social and 
economic conditions that there are a number of legitimate concerns underlying 
the Maoist insurgency: caste and ethnic discrimination, inequity, poverty, and 
lack of basic life-sustaining services top the list. Each side in the Nepalese 
conflict proposes to address the concerns and thus gain the support of the 
population in its own favor, but who holds more appeal: the state or the Maoists? 
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The political disposition of the affected population and the extent to which 
the people are acting upon those preferences are often the most overlooked and 
under-measured factors in insurgent conflict, despite their absolute centrality, in 
favor of military matters. In a society as diverse and structurally segmented such 
as Nepal, individual needs, attitudes, and preferences vary greatly from city to 
city, village to village, and between cities and villages. A functioning democracy 
intends to reflect these concerns and opinions in political deliberations. In Nepal, 
the democratic institutions have been in suspended animation since 2002, when 
Parliament was suspended and local elections ceased. The lack of 
representative government, combined with a severely restricted media and a 
fragile security environment, makes it difficult to objectively gauge popular 
sentiment—especially in areas most affected by the insurgency. 
Independent Nepalese researchers have adopted a valuable substitute for 
tools of political debate and media: the popular opinion poll. The Asia Foundation 
and Interdisciplinary Analysts conducted an extensive and well-representative 
poll of Nepalis in late 2004 to examine the national and regional attitudes and 
priorities of the citizens. The insights of the poll reveal very important perceptions 
of the state of affairs in Nepal, the needs of the people, and potential conflict 
resolution strategies. Key findings of the opinion poll are presented in Table 3. 
The authors of the report remind readers that the polling was done prior to 
King Gyanendra’s royal coup in February 2005; nonetheless, the poll reveals 
powerful insights to be considered in the counterinsurgency strategy. Clearly the 
Nepalis that were surveyed want democracy and the rights that come with it. 
Furthermore, people favor (at least at the time of the polling) a constitutional 
monarchy with a popularly elected Parliament and a prime minister responsible 
to the Parliament as the only legitimate form of government. On the specific 
question of legitimacy, only 22% saw the King and 2% saw the Maoists as 
legitimate rulers.71 
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Topic Findings
Democracy & Monarchy 77% favor democracy. The most important elements are freedom of 
expression and rule by elected representatives, religious freedom and 
rule of law are also important. Greatest concerns are corruption, reneging 
on promises, and instability.
53% favor a constitutional monarchy. Extreme options were less popular: 
only 5.5 per cent favored absolutemonarchy, and 4.9% favored no 
monarchy. 14% were undecided. A prime minister responsible to 
Parliament was seen as the only legitimate government.
57% believe situation of country has not improved since King's 
intervention in politics in 2002, nor do they think his involvement can bring 
about a political resolution. They do not entirely blame King for situation in 
country.
Contemporary Situation Most identify the Maoist insurgency, corruption, and violence/insecurity, 
and poverty as the greatest problems facing the country. Perception at 
the national level, but not in every location, is that the Maoist insurgency 
has grown stronger.
Local Government 59% are experiencing problems due to the absence of local political and 
administrative units since June 2002. Top problems include obtaining 
official permission or implementing programs and a lack of decision-
making related to local issues.
Constituent Assembly Less than 15% of the people in Nepal understand what a constituent 
assembly is all about, despite media attention and political debate.
Maoist Movement & Peace Talks At the local level, 72% believe that Maoist movement is at a status quo; 
19% believe the movement is spreading, with reasons being corruption of 
local politicians and underprivileged lagging behind; 6% believe 
movement is decreasing, due to effective security and popular 
disillusionment with Maoists.
On solutions to the Maoist insurgency, people accord priority to peace 
talks, then ceasefire, and finally fulfillment of Maoist demands. 
Suppression of rebels by security forces or vice versa is not popular.
73% believe that the insurgency can be settled through talks, but most do 
not trust that the government nor Maoist leadership is serious about 
peace talks; 53% favor third-party mediation to break the deadlock.
Solution to Political Stalemate 41% favor round-table talks as first step; 31% do not see a problem with 
interim government that includes Maoists as second step; constitutional 
questions are seen as third step. On the subject of the constitution: 35% 
favor amending present constitution; 17% want new constitution; 10% 
support development of new constitution by constituent assembly.
 
Table 3.   Nepal Opinion Poll Results72 
The polling results further indicated to the researchers that people did not 
differentiate between effectiveness of administration and legitimacy, which may 
indicate a popular willingness to accept any political solution that addresses their 
problems. The people also expect the Maoist insurgency to be settled through 
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peace talks and not military action, but they do not trust either the government or 
the Maoist leadership to earnestly pursue such talks. Interestingly, the people 
indicate they would approve a political framework in which a constitutional 
monarch, multi-party democracy, and the Maoists all fit. 
Despite the research analysts’ admission of relative under-sampling in the 
most severely insurgency-affected districts, the poll reveals a more refined 
picture of needs and priorities in comparable villages. In some places, socio-
economic concerns such as unemployment or corruption rose above the Maoist 
insurgency in priority. The rural areas also described difficulties due to a lack of 
local governance. Additionally, the poll clearly identifies the reasons for the 
spread or recession of Maoist activity in local areas: expansion is due to 
weakness in administration and economics; diminishing activity is related to 
improved security and disillusionment with the Maoists.  
All of the insights above are useful to calibrate the status of the conflict in 
Nepal with respect to attitudes and priorities of the target population. Questions 
linger, however, with regards to the nature and extent of support to either the 
state or Maoists in affected areas. Specifically, are there links between attitudes 
and actions, or are the preferences expressed in the polls simply natural 
preferences in the absence of external pressures? There is clearly a distinction in 
behavior between the cities and the rural areas, and it is most likely due to 
differences in security levels and available services.  
Major urban areas are relatively secure and face little Maoist influence 
except for occasional incidents of extortion attempts, robberies, and the like, 
therefore people do not face dire consequences of support for one side over 
another. Pro-democracy protests in the streets of Kathmandu and other large 
cities indicate dissatisfaction with the royal government, but protests and anti-
royal rhetoric do not translate into active support for the Maoists. If anything, 
urban populations probably fall in the category of active supporters of the state, 
as they continue to comply with legal and security requirements—even if they do 
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so grudgingly. As long as this dynamic holds, it seems very difficult for the 
Maoists to make inroads to the urban population. 
Rural areas, however, face very real consequences of their political 
choices and behaviors. The situation in the villages is much more fluid and is 
linked to prevailing activities of the state or the Maoists—a product of assisted 
preferences, as Leites and Wolf described. As the Nepali opinion poll indicated, 
the rural parts of the country place social and economic concerns higher on the 
priority list than the insurgency, which suggests a very pragmatic attitude. The 
Marxist-socialist agenda of the Maoists has a natural appeal to the depressed 
peasantry who, as Deepak Thapa notes, “feels at best poorly served by its 
government and at worst preyed on by officials.”73  
Coercive measures by both the state security forces and the Maoists have 
direct and immediate effects on the temporary level of support, and put the rural 
population in a very dangerous position. State security forces and the Maoists 
want different things from the people: the state wants timely and accurate 
intelligence on Maoist activities; the Maoists want the people to remain silent and 
to provide the Maoists with materiel and labor in order to continue the People’s 
War. Redress of social injustice and economic disparity, and improvement of 
government services and legal access are obvious concerns of the rural 
population. It is not clear at this time which contestant is making real progress in 
satisfying these concerns. 
5. Mobilization 
It is difficult to place exact numbers on the status of either the state’s or 
the Maoists’ mobilization, especially in the primary target populations of the rural 
areas. However, independent analysts of Nepal’s on-going conflict have noted 
several general observations and trends. It is essential to remember that Nepal is 
a nation of about 25 million people, and even the high estimates of active 
Maoists or supporters only total 1% of the population. It seems unfathomable that 
a movement based on a brutal and failed Communist philosophy could spread 
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and threaten the state’s very existence from such a small support base, but that 
is exactly the status of conflict in Nepal today. Perhaps the keys to resolving the 
insurgency there may best be found in the lessons emerging from the past nine 
years of conflict. 
a. The State 
The mobilization challenge for the Nepalese government is two-
fold: preserve the active support of its citizens in cities and in rural areas under 
firm government control; and, to improve active (or at least tacit) support from 
citizens in contested rural areas. These parallel goals reflect the different realities 
of the people in Nepal today, and imply divergent recruitment strategies and 
tactics for the cities versus the villages. Unfortunately, the government has had 
trouble on both fronts due to poor policy choices, misplaced priorities, poor 
execution, and constrained resources. 
In the cities, the people want democracy, economic improvement, 
and a just and fair legal system which preserves fundamental civil rights. When 
the political parties were in charge via the Parliament, people in the cities had 
freedom and were growing prosperous—but at the expense of impoverished 
citizens in rural areas.74 Ignorance by the Parliament of the Maoist problem for 
the first five years allowed the Maoists to expand their influence on the rural 
areas and impact the cities where they most felt it—the economy. Since the 
King’s first direct involvement in 2001, and especially since his takeover of 
government in February 2005, not only has the economy continued to suffer, but 
also democracy has been largely squelched. The policies of the king are largely 
unpopular, as daily protests in major cities indicate, and are driving away foreign 
aid and investment dollars that are needed to keep the economy afloat. As the 
opinion poll cited in the previous section shows, the current regime’s policies 
appear to be grossly out of line with popular preferences and are ripe for appeals 
by the Maoists to lend more active support in eliminating the monarchy.  
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The state’s other mobilization challenge is the rural villages—areas 
that are more directly contested by the Maoists. Chitra Tiwari noted the problem 
of the villages in 2001, “Nepali strategic planners have failed to find a way in 
which people would stop giving sanctuaries to guerrillas.”75 Tiwari suggests that 
massive economic development in affected areas early in the fight may have 
achieved state goals, but sustained killings in these areas at the hands of both 
the government and the Maoists have made such aid irrelevant and ineffective. 
Furthermore, when aid does arrive, Tiwari writes, “an entrenched coalition of 
corrupt politicians” is the first to profit at the expense of local villagers.76 The 
mobilization challenge remains daunting for the government in these affected 
areas. At best, the people could be considered ‘swing’ support based upon 
prevailing conditions. Until permanent improvements are made in the security 
situation, accompanied by equitable local government and development 
programs, support from these people will be tenuous. 
The RNA’s general concept of operations to counter the insurgency 
recognizes the value of the civil-military actions. The RNA’s campaign plan 
outlines the following tasks: offensive operations against Maoist bases; securing 
lines of communication; search and destroy missions; counter-smuggling 
operations along the border; securing district official facilities; intelligence; 
psychological operations; and civic action (development projects).77  
Despite their acknowledgement of the importance of “hearts and 
minds” to combating the problem, the government’s and RNA’s policies and 
actions in the field have not yet inspired widespread support from the affected 
people. For example, King Gyanendra conducted tours of affected Eastern and 
Far Western districts in August 2005, to “assess the situation and meet the 
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people”;78 consequently, the King admonished politicians and appointed officials 
alike to put aside petty issues and focus on the people. In King Gyanendra’s 
words, 
The people or agencies or mechanisms that are supposed to serve 
the people, should understand their duty and I want to warn them - 
this is not the time to [ignore people]. They will need to be provided 
the facilities. They will have to serve the people. This is not the time 
to seek excuses.79  
These are promising words, but they mask the restrictions imposed by the King 
on the people in February 2005 and they gloss over the harsh reality found in the 
field due to a lack of basic security and development. 
Furthermore, Nepal’s security forces are among the worlds’ worst 
offenders of human rights, despite specialized training from the U.S. military and 
formal pledges to the U.N. to curb such behavior. According to the U.S. 
Department of State, Nepal continued to commit numerous serious abuses 
through 2004. Violations included arbitrary and unlawful lethal force, abuse and 
torture of detainees, and disappearances; impunity remained a problem, 
although the military investigated some claims of abuses and found several 
soldiers guilty under court martial.80 Although the RNA is actively attempting to 
improve its image with respect to the people by taking on projects such as road 
construction, its dismal human rights record seriously dissuades open support by 
frightened and threatened villagers. Additionally, temporary RNA encampments 
in villages do little to help local residents in the long term, as the villagers may 
face reprisals from the Maoists for not resisting the government’s presence. 
Judging by available reports, few resources appear to be dedicated to 
establishing a permanent and cooperative government security presence in 
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contested villages, which could in turn lead to an effective apparatus necessary 
to harness support from the people. 
b. The Counterstate 
As discussed in previous sections, even if taken to extreme 
estimates, the number of active Maoists represents just 1% of Nepalis. The fact 
that this small number of active fighters and supporters threatens the future of 
the remaining 99% of the population validates T.E. Lawrence’s famous 
assessment of insurgency, “Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in 
striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”81 While the Maoists may 
never achieve domination of the hearts and minds of a large percentage of 
Nepalis, especially in the urban, well-off, and upper castes, they certainly carry 
enough popular support to dominate several rural areas in the country and 
influence lives in almost every other area. 
There are a number of reasons why people lend support to the 
Maoists. In some cases, support flows freely to the Maoists in the absence of 
state government or the failure of its officials to equitably meet the needs of the 
local population. The main fighting and support forces consist of mixes of ethnics, 
high caste people, and low caste ‘untouchable’ people from the most severely 
depressed districts in the Western and mid-Western zones of Nepal.82 In this 
sense, the above groups are united in their misery and anger against corrupt 
officials who prey upon them. Involvement with the Maoists offers a chance to 
redress historic injustice, even to the extent of delivering retribution against their 
oppressors, and to implement a supposedly just socialist order in the villages. 
Additionally, women feature prominently in Maoist recruiting and 
propaganda. Reports indicate that one-fifth to one-third of the cadre and 
combatants may be women.83 Women in Nepal are particularly vulnerable to 
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abuse and exploitation, for a variety of reasons; involvement in the Maoist 
movement provides women a chance to fight structural injustices as well as gain 
a sense of personal control of their circumstances.  
The Maoists also enjoy a large following in the student unions. The 
All Nepal National Independent Students Union (Revolutionary), or ANNISU-R is 
the student wing of the Maoists. Its membership comprises students from 
secondary school to the university level. According to the Maoists, the ANNISU-R 
comprises approximately 600,000 members from age nine and above.84 Based 
on the ages and widely dispersed locations of these supposed sympathizers, 
they are mainly used to support centrally-directed education strikes and street 
protests and not armed fighting. The degree and quality of commitment in this 
group is questionable due to the students’ youth and the forced nature of their 
indoctrinations into the movement. Nonetheless, the student wing dramatically 
swells the extent of popular support, even if it is low quality and only for 
temporary activities. 
Nepal’s Maoists have followed the recruiting path of other Maoist 
groups in terms of identifying target audiences and recruiting methods. Typically, 
the Maoists target remote villages and sever physical and psychological links 
with the existing system by destroying critical infrastructures and killing or driving 
away key local officials.85 Once isolated, Maoist cadres spread the party’s 
ideology to the villages through forced abductions or forced indoctrinations, and 
compel individuals to pay taxes, to provide food or shelter, or to supply people for 
military service and forced-labor projects. Through voluntary or involuntary 
participation in Maoist activities, no matter how small, villagers’ fates may be 
sealed as they are considered Maoist sympathizers by the government. In large 
part, fear of the Maoists is a primary motivator for people to join or provide tacit 
support to the movement, just as fear of indiscriminate government punishment 
keeps people from revealing such support.  
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While coercive means have been used continuously in remote 
villages since the outbreak of armed insurgency, Maoists have attempted other 
recruiting techniques to pursue a larger target audience. During the 2003 
ceasefire, the Maoists pursued a political campaign to explain its ideas and 
concepts for the future of Nepalese politics to the people.86 The end of the 
ceasefire curtailed efforts to court public opinion, so the Maoists instead worked 
to create a number of district councils, with the objective of taking control of 
Kathmandu; reports suggested that these efforts were not successful and 
showed a weakness in the Maoists ability to participate in local politics.87 
The Maoists are reportedly experiencing difficulties training and 
equipping new recruits as a consequence of their reliance upon pilfered or 
captured weapons and equipment. This problem is compounded as Maoists 
increase their operations tempo, exceed their supplies, and strain popular 
support that sustains the movement.88 Additionally, recent dramatic and brutal 
Maoist attacks have drawn widespread condemnation within Nepal and in the 
international community. In one example, the Maoists detonated a land mine as a 
passenger bus passed over it, killing 38 and injuring over 70 people.89 In another 
example, in the course of a major engagement with the RNA, the Maoists 
captured, brutally killed, and dismembered over a dozen RNA soldiers.90 In both 
cases, the stature and image of the Maoists greatly suffered in the international 
community and senior Maoists had to quickly respond to clean up the mess. 
Overall, the Maoists now appear to be facing similar organizational constraints 
that led to ceasefire and negotiations in both 2001 and 2003, which may partly 
explain the recent unilateral ceasefire announcement by Chairman Prachanda. 
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6. Attrition 
Neither the state nor Maoist insurgents have what could be called a 
modern military force. Despite this, or maybe because of it, the conflict in Nepal 
has been brutal and bloody to the tune of over 12,000 killed since 1996. On one 
hand, the lack of modern firepower may limit casualties during specific 
engagements; on the other hand, neither side can deliver a truly crushing blow to 
the other simultaneously in all parts of the country. As with most insurgent 
warfare in lesser-developed countries, the conflict naturally has evolved to a 
stalemate of strikes and counter-strikes—with the rural population caught in the 
middle—and there is no apparent military solution in sight.   
a. The State 
Observers of Nepal’s conflict note that the introduction of RNA 
forces to the counterinsurgency during 2002 led to a sharp increase in the level 
of violence. The greater firepower of the RNA, as compared to the Nepal Police 
and the Armed Police Force, led to some initial advances against the Maoists; 
the Maoists have since adjusted tactics to insure against engagements where the 
security forces hold superior numbers or firepower. Government security forces 
are mainly lightly armed foot soldiers with limited strategic and tactical mobility, 
due to poor transportation routes and few airborne resources. Poor, if any, 
intelligence on the location and identity of Maoist forces further hampers security 
forces. It has also led security forces to misapply or indiscriminately use force, 
thus affecting the very population the government aims to protect. Not only are 
the security forces missing the Maoists, but they are also decreasing relative 
support to the government. Training is also a problem; as the RNA pursues its 
expansion in troop strength (from 45,000 to 72,000 in just the years 2001-
2004)91), it must train new recruits in basic combat skills and counterinsurgency 
methods. Obviously, this dynamic will continuously affect combat performance as 
the RNA grows. While it is true that the RNA has occasional large scale victories 
and enjoy an aggregate exchange ratio of 10 Maoists killed for every 
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counterinsurgent killed92, the Maoists still have nearly complete freedom of 
movement and have inflicted significant casualties on the RNA in recent mass 
assaults, thus delivering powerful psychological damage as well as material 
damage. 
b. The Counterstate 
The Maoists have adroitly used the tools available to them and 
have made significant strides in tactical combat performance since the outbreak 
of the “People’s War”. The insurgents’ tactical flexibility and adaptability to the 
resources, territory, and weapons available is most impressive. They clearly use 
their information advantage to punishing effect on government security forces. 
The Maoists have shown the ability to mount brigade-size assaults on RNA 
encampments, largely undetected by government intelligence.93 Further, they 
have expanded the use of IEDs to deny access to territory, to target military 
patrols, and to generally terrorize urban populations.94 The Maoists’ use of 
guerrilla tactics and pragmatic ability to ‘live off the land’ ensures that they will 
sustain the fight against the government’s security forces for a long time; 
however, it does not posture the Maoists to deliver the crushing assault on the 
state that is called for in their final doctrinal phase of strategic offensive. Simply, 
the Maoists lack the numbers, equipment, and strategic mobility to deliver such a 
widespread attack. 
D. ASSESSMENT 
This chapter presented an analytic framework in which one may analyze 
insurgent conflict in terms of systems in a competition to mobilize popular support 
and eliminate the opposing system. The fundamental dynamics of the conceptual 
and mathematical insurgency models hold true, to varying degrees, in Nepal 
today. Based on this report’s admittedly cursory analysis of Nepal’s Maoist 
insurgency, some general conclusions may be drawn regarding the status of the 
conflict and a basic calibration of the insurgency models may be made.  
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At the strategic level, the conflict between the state and the Maoists is at a 
stalemate. Maoists are able to conduct armed operations virtually anywhere in 
the country, and may even approach the cities in their recruitment and political 
activism; but, the state also has free roam of the country, scores significant 
tactical victories when they discover large groups of Maoists, and retains control 
of a politically agitated—but fundamentally submissive—urban population. How 
long the conflict remains at this status quo is uncertain. 
The King’s takeover of government, suspension of civil liberties, and 
increased security operations since February 2005 have probably hurt, more 
than helped, Nepal’s citizens. More important, the royal actions have brought the 
political contest even more sharply into a three-way battle between the 
monarchy, the mainstream political parties, and the Maoists. Internal political and 
security crises have spilled over into the arena of foreign support and threaten a 
lifeline of economic and military aid, by alienating foreign donors. Economic 
troubles are intensifying in the present environment, completing a circular effect 
on the underlying political and military conflict. 
At the grassroots level, the contest for popular support also remains at 
status quo. The government has proposed a holistic strategy to address popular 
needs and aspirations, but has not committed the resources to provide 
permanent security and governance in conflict areas—some of which have been 
abandoned by the government for years. Problems with security forces’ 
performance during interactions with civilians persist and continue to rob the 
government of legitimacy. Additionally, the government is risking the loss of 
mainstream urban support because of its unpopular emergency measures that 
restrict citizens’ civil liberties. The Maoists continue their mix of both coercive and 
cooperative recruitment measures in rural conflict areas, generally maintaining 
the ground they presently own. However, the Maoists have not made progress in 
mobilizing mass support among the larger urban populations.  
As a result of the above considerations, domestic and foreign analysts 
mostly agree that there is no strictly military solution to the conflict given the 
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present dynamics, and they conclude that the government and the Maoists must 
negotiate a settlement. If one places the facts and dynamics of the present 
situation in Nepal into the conceptual and mathematic insurgency models of this 
paper—despite their admittedly simple nature—this assessment is largely 
validated. The peril of any model is that it is a simplified view of a sometimes very 
complex problem. The Lanchester insurgency equations presented in this paper 
are not immune from this caveat, especially in light of the compartmentalized 
nature of insurgency with respect to local versus national conditions and the 
great difficulty involved in obtaining accurate data from conflict-affected areas. 
Nonetheless, the models provide a meaningful tool to postulate the comparative 
effects of competing strategies on the dynamics of conflict in Nepal. 
The parameters that broadly structure insurgent conflict were listed in 
Figure 4. As a reminder, the critical parameters affecting mobilization and attrition 
include the size of each side’s hard core support base, organization growth 
parameter, and combat effectiveness coefficient. A core challenge of any 
modeling and analysis effort is to obtain accurate data to a level of specificity 
consistent with the sophistication of the model itself. Data available from this 
study of Nepal’s insurgency is somewhat superficial in detail and generic in the 
sense that it reflects aggregate performance across conflict zones; however, it is 
adequate to meet this study’s illustrative intentions. Accordingly, insurgent and 
counterinsurgent growth and combat effectiveness parameters were assessed 
using a relative ranking of low, medium, or high. Then, these rankings were 
converted to values on a scale of zero to one with the following calibrations: 0.25 
(low); 0.5 (medium); and 0.9 (high).  
In addition to calibrating data as described above, several modifications of 
the insurgency combat models were necessary to reflect the environmental 
conditions of Nepal. As discussed earlier in this paper, Nepali popular needs and 
priorities vary greatly between the country’s urban and rural populations. To 
reflect this reality, the mobilization model is adjusted to separately consider each 
organization’s urban and rural support bases. Further, the growth parameter for 
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each organization is likewise assumed to differ between urban and rural target 
populations. Thus, the mobilization model now includes two equations for 
calculating popular support—one each for the urban and rural populations. On 
the attrition side, it is also assumed that the insurgents and counterinsurgents 
have different combat effectiveness in rural versus urban areas, owing to each 
side’s present strengths and weaknesses in various environmental factors.   
Therefore, the attrition equations were modified to include different combat 
effectiveness parameters for rural and urban engagements. Figure 14 shows the 
revised insurgency model, which incorporates the modifications just described. 
Not only does the revised model better reflect the bifurcated nature of the conflict 
in Nepal, but it also allows the analyst to postulate and examine the relative 
effects of different counterinsurgency strategies in the villages or cities. 
With the above caveats and clarifications set, Table 4 presents an 
assessment of the conflict parameters in Nepal to use in the analytic framework 
proposed by this paper. For modeling purposes, the initial size of each 
organization represents upper limits of current organizational support in rural and 
urban populations, and is expressed as a fraction of Nepal’s estimated total 
population of 25 million people. Current government support is estimated at 10% 
of rural and 40% of urban populations, including security forces; current Maoist 
support is estimated at 5% of rural and 10% of urban populations, again including 
armed elements. The government is assumed to have hardcore support from no 
more than 5% of rural and 25% of urban populations; the Maoists are assumed 
to have hardcore support from not more than 2% of rural and 5% of urban 
populations, again including armed elements. The remaining population is 
assumed to be ‘up for grabs’ in the conflict, and will respond to recruitment and 
attrition as described by the insurgency model. 
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Interactive Insurgency Model (Revised)
Where:
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Figure 13.   Revised Interactive Insurgency Model 
 
While these estimates represent this author’s educated guess based on 
available research material, alternative interpretations by other analysts with 
more refined data sources are entirely possible. It is most important at this 
juncture of analysis that estimates are proportionally accurate within categories 
and that the measurements are placed on a common scale, rather than being 
absolutely correct; this way, one can compare ‘apples to apples’. Furthermore, 
these estimates may be updated at any time if better data surfaces or dynamics 
change in Nepal. 
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Parameter Description Maoists State 
xr0 Size of insurgent organization: rural 0.043  
xu0 Size of insurgent organization: urban 0.015  
yr0 Size of counterinsurgent organization: rural  0.085 
yu0 Size of counterinsurgent organization: urban  0.060 
ar Insurgent growth parameter: rural Med  
au Insurgent growth parameter: urban Low  
br Counterinsurgent growth parameter: rural  Low 
br Counterinsurgent growth parameter: urban  Med 
mr’ Counterinsurgent combat effectiveness parameter: rural  Med 
mu’ Counterinsurgent combat effectiveness parameter: urban  High 
nr’ Insurgent combat effectiveness parameter: rural Med  
nu’ Insurgent combat effectiveness parameter: urban Low  
Table 4.   Estimated Parameters of Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency 
The set of parameters outlined in Table 4 serves as a baseline scenario 
from which alternative information-based strategies will be explored in later 
sections of this paper. Assuming nothing changes in the conflict parameters of 
Table 4, the baseline scenario that represents Nepal’s insurgency plays out as 
shown in Figure 15. In this case, the conflict starts out with the government 
holding a four-to-one initial size advantage, but the insurgents use their relative 
advantage in recruiting the rural population to quickly level the playing field and 
force a stalemate where the insurgents dominate the rural areas and the 
government controls only the cities. Each side’s growth in the respective conflict 
areas is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15.   Organizational Growth in Baseline Insurgency Scenario 
The baseline scenario provides a crude but powerful illustration of the 
asymmetric nature of insurgency, particularly when there is such a stark 
difference in the mobilization and attrition capabilities of each force depending 
upon the nature of the population surrounding them. In the case of Nepal, the 
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government’s moderate combat capabilities cannot counter the Maoists’ 
moderate recruitment efforts in rural areas, most likely due to poor target location 
and identification; as the Maoists grow in these areas, they are able to take out 
the government agents at an increasing pace until they are eliminated. The 
opposite dynamic is observed in the cities, where the government enjoys a high 
kill capability and moderate recruitment compared to the Maoists. This should not 
surprise anyone given the government’s strategy of massing its forces in urban 
areas, where it can flood the streets with security personnel and provide relative 
protection and prosperity for the people; this, in turn, leads residents to report 
insurgent activity.  
The fundamental problem in this fight, from the government’s perspective, 
is demographics: there are simply too many rural people in too many rural areas 
to overcome through any advantage in the few urban centers. The only thing 
keeping the government in the game, in terms of the model, is the fact that the 
Maoists are too weak in urban recruiting or urban kill capabilities. The challenge 
for the government now is how to improve their stake in the rural fight while 
simultaneously preserving its decisive edge in the cities. Fortunately, the basic 
insurgency model presented in this paper allows one to propose alternative 
strategies to influence the underlying dynamics and asymmetries of this conflict, 
and measure their resulting effects in the conflict areas. The next chapter of this 
report examines the government’s situation and explores available strategies to 



























III. NEPAL’S INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE 
INFORMATION DIMENSION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes the information dimension of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency in Nepal. First, the chapter presents a theoretical framework 
that identifies the variables and dynamics of insurgency that information directly 
or indirectly affects and postulates where, when, and why information has the 
most significant impact. Next, the chapter describes the tools of information 
systems and operations that are most relevant and useful to fighting insurgency. 
Finally, the chapter evaluates the conflict in Nepal to appreciate how local 
circumstances there shape information strategies and to assess the extent and 
effectiveness of each side’s use of information operations in the fight. 
B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY 
It may be tempting at this point to try to isolate a single conflict variable, 
parameter, or strategy as the ‘best way’ to defeat the insurgency in Nepal. 
McCormick and Giordano caution against this temptation when they note: 
The ways in which the variables and parameters in the model 
interact with each other to influence the course and outcome of the 
conflict are complex. They must be considered interactively rather 
than independently. The direction of the game, in every case, will 
reflect these reciprocal dynamics.95 
Therein lays the core challenge for a counterinsurgency strategist: what is the 
right blend of strategies and tactics that constructively addresses natural tensions 
between mobilization versus attrition, rural versus urban environments, and 
insurgent-focused versus counterinsurgent-focused efforts? McCormick and 
Giordano point out that the structural conditions and present status of a conflict 
define the ‘operating space’ and the dynamics that insurgents or 
counterinsurgents must conquer if they are to win in this fight.96 
                                            
95 McCormick and Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” 26. 
96 Ibid, 24. 
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Each side in insurgent conflict may influence the fight by changing the 
model’s controlling parameters, through what McCormick and Giordano define as 
either “short cycle” or “long cycle” strategies.97  Short cycle strategies are defined 
as those strategies that each player may use within the present structure of the 
game; long cycle strategies are defined as those strategies that are designed to 
change the shape of the underlying structure of the conflict. Design and selection 
of alternative strategies, whether short or long cycle in nature, depend on a 
combatant having an adequate analytic framework and solid information from 
which to work. Furthermore, information operations also provide powerful ways to 
influence the controlling parameters of insurgent conflict. 
1. Short Cycle Strategies 
Short cycle strategies are designed to affect the conflict in the short run by 
manipulating the mobilization and attrition parameters that characterize 
interactions between combatants and target populations, and engagements 
between combatants. Short cycle strategies target the revised interactive 
insurgency model’s (Figure 14) controlling parameters of growth (a and b) and 
combat effectiveness (m’ and n’). Each of these parameters differs in rural and 
urban environments; therefore, strategies to control the game must be calibrated 
according to the conditions of the particular environment in question. To account 
for the interactive effects of mobilization and attrition, short cycle strategies must 
specifically affect the ratios of the each side’s growth parameter to the other 
side’s combat effectiveness parameter (a/m’ and b/n’). 
There are two general categories of short cycle strategies to consider: 
“insurgent-focused” or “state-focused” alternatives.98 Insurgent-focused efforts 
are designed to affect the mobilization capabilities of the guerrillas in the face of 
state attacks. In this case, the counterinsurgent wants to reduce the ratio a/m’ by 
reducing the insurgent’s growth parameter, by increasing the counterinsurgent’s 
combat effectiveness, or through a combination of both. State-focused efforts are 
                                            
97 McCormick and Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” 27. 
98 Ibid, 27-28. 
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designed to affect the mobilization capabilities of the counterinsurgents in the 
face of insurgent attacks. In this case, the counterinsurgent aims to increase the 
ratio b/n’ by improving the counterinsurgent’s growth parameter, by reducing the 
counterinsurgent’s combat effectiveness, or through a combination of both. 
Mobilization requires, as this paper discussed earlier, dedication of 
organizational resources to recruitment, promises or threats to influence the 
choice of the target population, and a capacity to absorb and employ recruits. 
Mobilization is inherently a battle to influence the opinions and actions of the 
population in favor of one side over another. Influence, whether it is based on 
promises or threats that assist popular preferences, is a psychological process 
with four component parts: the insurgent that makes a threat or promise; the 
target audience that receives the threat or promise; the threat or promise itself; 
and the expectation that the insurgent can and will deliver on its threat or promise 
to the population. It follows that short cycle efforts to reduce the effectiveness of 
insurgent mobilization may focus on any one of these components, and that 
armed force has at best a minor and supporting role in countering mobilization. In 
order to affect mobilization, strategies should focus on the psychological battle 
and target its component parts with a range of information- and influence-
oriented tools and tactics. 
On the attrition side of insurgent-focused short cycle strategy, the 
counterinsurgent must raise his combat effectiveness to a greater extent than the 
insurgent can mobilize his resources. Combat effectiveness, as discussed earlier 
in this paper, is a product of firepower, security force members’ skills and will, 
and most importantly, information regarding the identity and location of the 
insurgents.  Firepower and soldiers’ skills are mainly structural issues that are 
difficult to manipulate in the short term, with minor exceptions for training in areas 
such as human rights and laws of armed conflict. However, the counter-
insurgent’s will to fight and his intelligence capabilities may be significantly 
impacted in the short run through a host of information-oriented tools and tactics. 
Furthermore, investment in better information has the additional benefit of 
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improving target discrimination, which in itself helps minimize collateral damage 
to the affected population and reduces a major theme of insurgent recruitment. 
Turning to state-focused short cycle strategies, the state faces the reverse 
challenge of insurgent-focused activities. In this case, the state must energize 
and harness its own psychological process of recruiting supporters by improving 
each of the process’ components. In this regard, the state’s challenge is similar 
to the insurgents: it must create, package, and deliver an effective blend of 
positive and negative incentives to gain the support of the people. To be 
effective, the state’s mobilization effort must: assign adequate resources on the 
task of recruiting; present relevant, feasible, and fair promises and threats to the 
target population; and, be perceived as capable of delivering on such measures. 
Once again, security forces play an important but subservient role in this 
process; they must be seen as agents of a positive agenda and act accordingly. 
The other elements in the mobilization process are also essential for the 
counterinsurgent to be successful, and there are a range of information-based 
strategies and tactics available to support the process. 
Finally, the state’s challenge in the short run with respect to the 
insurgent’s combat capabilities is to minimize the guerrilla’s combat 
effectiveness. Logically, this strategy is similar but opposite to the insurgent-
focused approach to attrition. In this case, the government wishes to reduce the 
insurgent’s firepower, skill, motivation, or information. Once again, the primary 
objectives of short-term activities should be to reduce the enemy’s will to fight, to 
diminish its ability to effectively coordinate its fight, and to reduce the insurgent’s 
information advantage with respect to the government forces’ locations, actions, 
and intentions. Each of these short run strategies have information-based 
alternative solutions. 
2. Long Cycle Strategies 
Long cycle strategies are designed to affect the conflict in the long run by 
influencing the political disposition of the population, which structures and limits 
the contest itself. Long cycle strategies target the revised interactive insurgency 
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model’s (Figure 14) recruitment pools (kx and ky) by expanding or contracting the 
level of each side’s hard-core support (kx* and ky*), or they target the underlying 
distribution of popular support from a favorable to unfavorable state (or vice-
versa). These parameters differ in rural and urban environments, so strategies 
must be calibrated accordingly. Long cycle strategies more directly reflect the 
zero-sum nature of insurgency; therefore, in order to change the size of the 
potential recruitment pool, one side or the other has to add or lose hard-core 
supporters. 
Once again, the insurgency model reveals the manifest political, rather 
than military, nature of this form of conflict. Armed forces are necessary to 
eventually find, fix, and kill the opponent, but they may only do so when they 
enjoy material and information resources supplied by the people. The size, 
equipment, skill, motivation, and disposition of armed elements may lead to 
temporary swings in support, and may serve as a source of pride or recruitment 
to each side’s cause, but they do little to change the mind of hard-core followers. 
What matters most in the long term is how each side addresses the legitimate 
needs and aspirations of the target populations, be they rural or urban. While it 
may never be possible for a counterinsurgent to convert an insurgent’s hard-core 
follower to his side, it is very possible to limit the expansion of the opponent’s 
hard-core following by implementing wise policies that meet people’s demands. 
Fortunately, a wide array of information-based tools and tactics are available to 
pursue this strategy. 
3. Information-Based Approaches 
As the previous two sections discussed, there are short run and long run 
approaches to fighting insurgencies; some are focused on the insurgents, and 
some are aimed at the counterinsurgents. In all cases, however, military 
solutions are mainly subordinate to political and psychological strategies. The 
latter approaches may be loosely classified as ‘information-based’ strategies. 
These measures aim to influence people and to acquire, manipulate, exploit, or 
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deny information. Table 5 summarizes the strategies, target parameters, relevant 
factors, and appropriate responses available to counterinsurgents. 
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Mobilization (a, b) Recruiters 
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Long Cycle    
Recruitment Pools (kx*, ky*)  √  
Political Distribution  √  
Table 5.   Information-Based Counterinsurgency Approaches 
As Table 5 shows, there are information-based approaches available to 
some extent for virtually every counterinsurgency strategy proposed in this 
paper. This table does not imply that information-based alternatives alone will 
solve the problem of insurgency. Rather, it simply notes the inherent gaps in a 
military-only approach to insurgency—gaps that information operations can at 
least partially address. Robert Giesler, Director of Information Operations and 
Strategic Studies for the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 
encapsulates the role of information in counterinsurgency in the following way: 
“Information operations provide means to ‘cull the herd’, i.e. to separate active 
insurgents from passive supporters.”99 Furthermore, he describes information 
                                            
99 Robert Giesler, interview by author, written notes, (Monterey, CA, 13 April 2005). 
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operations as instrumental to steering contested populations and combatants in 
directions favorable to the state and away from insurgent positions.100 Finally, 
Giesler notes that information operations may be useful to expose and inhibit 
foreign support to insurgents, to the extent that such support exists.101 The next 
section of this report drills down into each of these areas to identify more 
precisely what information-based approaches are available to the 
counterinsurgency strategist and where they are best applied. 
C. TOOLS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS & OPERATIONS 
This section describes information systems and information operations 
concepts that are most relevant to the problem of insurgent warfare. Table 6 
presents a list of information-based activities that are most relevant to 
insurgencies. This paper focuses on the most relevant of U.S. military information 
operations concepts; further, it adds information-based activities that fall outside 
of established U.S. doctrine in the field but are meaningful to combat insurgency. 
Some of these information tools may be more useful or feasible than others in 
the fight against insurgents, but what is most important to note is that the tools 
are intended to be integrated as part of government-wide holistic strategy 
involving political leaders and security forces. The key to effective 
synchronization and employment of these tools lies in the knowledge of where 
each one fits in a unified counterinsurgency framework and strategy, which is 
discussed in the next sections of this paper. 
Public Information Electronic Warfare 
Public Diplomacy Computer Network Operations 
Psychological Operations Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Deception Command, Control, and Communications 
Operations Security Civil-Military Operations 
Table 6.   Tools of Information Systems & Operations 
                                            
100 Robert Giesler, interview by author. 
101 Ibid. 
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1. Public Information 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines public affairs as “those public information, 
command information, and community relations activities directed toward both 
the external and internal publics.”102 In the context of insurgency warfare, this 
paper extends this military-oriented definition of public affairs to the broader 
scope of government-wide relations with the media and the internal or external 
public audiences. Additionally, in insurgency warfare, public information is the 
dominant component of public affairs because it directly addresses the 
transmission of information to a target population. While internal command 
information is important to keep security members informed, it does little to 
change the calculus of insurgency and will not be emphasized here. The 
community relations component of public affairs is important, but will be 
discussed separately in a later section. 
Recalling that insurgency is as much a battle of ideas as it is a contest of 
armed forces, a counterinsurgent must develop and employ as many 
communications channels as possible to reach—and hopefully influence—the 
target population. This challenge is most relevant to the problem of mobilizing 
popular support, but also factors into the problem of attrition, albeit in a slightly 
different manner. In the case of mobilization, the process of influencing people to 
join one’s side in the fight requires both a credible message that presents a 
positive or negative incentive to the target audience, and a credible means to 
transmit the message to the population. In the case of attrition, the manner of 
combat as well as the results from exchanges between insurgents and 
counterinsurgents must be accurately presented to the general public, as they 
both factor into the target audience’s calculations of expectations of the 
consequences involved in supporting or resisting one side or the other. 
The requirements to have credible messages and credible delivery 
mechanisms hold regardless of whether one is pursuing short cycle or long cycle 
                                            
102Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html. 
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counterinsurgency strategies. The key challenge for a counterinsurgent in the 
area of public information is balancing the need for objective, timely, and 
accurate reporting of facts on the one hand, with the need for subjective pro-
government interpretations of those facts on the other hand. These 
interpretations are put forth by the state, and aim to garner public support for the 
counterinsurgent cause—or at least to preserve the public’s neutrality.  
An independent media provides critical functions in counterinsurgency 
efforts: it provides the general public with unbiased reporting of facts; and, it 
provides a credible forum for the state to refute distortions of facts, explain 
policies and opinions, and engage in dialogue with supporters and foes alike. 
The counterinsurgent may now focus on carefully constructing an argument in his 
favor and influencing the target audience to support his position by following a 
logical path of reasoning, which is supported by credible evidence available in 
the media. As a corollary process, the counterinsurgent may now refute the 
insurgent’s claims and appeals by presenting logical arguments and using 
credible evidence against the insurgent that was gathered by the independent 
media. According to U.S. doctrine, public information activities must be closely 
coordinated with respect to other ongoing information operations, such as 
psychological or deception operations. Each element of information operations is 
important, but must be perceived to be insulated from each other by the target 
audience in order to foster trust in the counterinsurgent, his message, and the 
media that delivers his message.  
Investment in developing trusted public information systems and 
transparency is just one part of improving the conflict parameters of mobilization 
and attrition; nonetheless, public information activities have powerful effects on 
the dynamics of insurgency. Most significantly, a constructive and believable 
government policy that is made visible and held accountable to the people by the 
independent media advances recruitment efforts. Furthermore, improvements in 
the independent media and in counterinsurgent’s public information activities 
may be made independent of insurgent activity, and they tend to have a ‘double-
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effect’ of de-legitimizing the insurgent’s propaganda and recruitment efforts. 
Finally, one must remember that a professional independent media is expected 
to report events ‘with warts and all’ attached; bad policies and poor execution 
should and will be reported, thus the state must be ready to explain such events 
when they arise and set terms for addressing such activities in the future. 
2. Public Diplomacy 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines public diplomacy as “those overt international 
public information activities of the United States Government designed to 
promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, 
and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the 
dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.”103 While this is a U.S.-centric definition, the concept of public diplomacy 
may be applied universally to every country. In the context of insurgent warfare, 
public diplomacy is a companion to formal diplomacy in that it aims to influence 
exogenous supporters of either the insurgent or counterinsurgent. To the degree 
that either side in a conflict relies on foreign support to mobilize or to fight, public 
diplomacy offers a means to persuade those supporters to lend additional 
support for one’s cause or cease support to one’s opponent. In contemporary 
conflicts, foreign support often comes not from formal state-to-state aid, but 
rather from non-governmental organizations or diasporas; in such circumstances, 
formal diplomacy may not be relevant or effective, so public diplomacy offers an 
alternative means to reach those parties.  
As experts in the field of public diplomacy have noted, it is generally a 
long-term rather than short-term activity. It is possible, however, to mount 
intensive short-term public diplomacy ‘blitzes’ in a crisis or critical decision-
making period where one wishes to gain foreign popular support to pressure their 
leaders into a course of action favorable to either the insurgent or 
counterinsurgent. During these flashpoints, it is essential for the counterinsurgent 
to coordinate public diplomacy efforts with concurrent domestic- and foreign-
                                            
103 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. 
 81
oriented information operations activities, such as public information, 
psychological operations, and deception. In order to maximize their collective 
results and avoid ‘fratricide’, each of these activities must be calibrated by 
consistent goals, themes, and messages. 
3. Psychological Operations 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines psychological operations (PSYOP) as “planned 
operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The 
purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.”104 Again, this definition is U.S.-
centric in its emphasis on foreign target audiences, but the concept of PSYOP is 
equally relevant and powerful in the case of domestic insurgencies. In many 
ways, the process of insurgent or counterinsurgent mobilization is in fact a 
PSYOP. The U.S. definition of PSYOP, however, is intended more for hostile or 
neutral audiences rather than friendly ones (public information or public 
diplomacy are more appropriate for these audiences).  
In the context of counterinsurgency, PSYOP may be used to counter 
insurgent mobilization, to lower the insurgent’s combat effectiveness, or to 
improve the counterinsurgent’s combat effectiveness. In the first case, the 
counterinsurgent develops themes and messages, supported by selected truthful 
information, to counter the appeal and expectations of the insurgent to the target 
population. Considering that the insurgent uses threats or promises to assist 
popular preferences, and he must have both the capability and will to follow 
through on such appeals, there are a few PSYOP approaches for the 
counterinsurgent to pursue. He may debunk the insurgent’s propaganda by 
demonstrating failures of the insurgent to deliver on threats or promises made, or 
he may promote an alternative and positive image of the government’s agenda 
and its ability to follow through on its threats and promises.  
                                            
104 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. 
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On the attrition side of insurgency, PSYOP may be used in a number of 
ways at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level, 
PSYOP may be used to create or exploit fissures or tensions among insurgent 
leaders. This is not an easy task, partly due to the difficulty in reaching 
clandestine figures and partly due to the strong ideological cohesion among 
senior cadres of insurgent groups. However, opportunities to affect leadership do 
arise during the course of insurgency, particularly in periods of sustained losses 
or at transition points such as cease-fires or peace talks. The intent of actions at 
this level is to create strategic confusion or paralysis, which in turn delays or 
disrupts campaign plans. 
More lucrative PSYOP strategies might be to attack the seams between 
the strategic and operation level leadership, and in the leadership chain between 
operational level cadres and military forces. The further one travels from the 
epicenter of insurgent ideological roots, there is typically a natural decay in the 
strength of belief and commitment to the ‘cause’; this is particularly pronounced 
in the transition from one level of command to the next. Counterinsurgents 
should closely monitor such individuals and their actions to detect opportunities 
for psychological attacks. The intent of actions at this level is to sow the seeds of 
doubt in the mid-level leaders towards the legitimacy of their cause or their 
expectations of victory in the fight, thus reducing their cohesiveness and will to 
fight on the battlefield. 
At the tactical level, PSYOP may be employed to achieve temporary and 
highly localized advantages in combat effectiveness. In advance of 
counterinsurgent offensives, for example, PSYOP may be used to persuade non-
combatants to stay home or stay away from a target area, which aids in the 
identification of friend or foe. In the same example, different themes are 
presented to enemy foot soldiers and operatives to persuade them to surrender 
or face certain destruction, or to motivate them to mass at a desired place and 
time to increase the counterinsurgent’s effective firepower. 
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For a counterinsurgent to be effective in any of the above PSYOP 
strategies, he must have highly reliable and specific intelligence tailored to the 
target audience of the operation. Then, the counterinsurgent must have credible 
channels available to convey messages to the audience and must be able to 
back up any claims with hard and verifiable evidence. Finally, the 
counterinsurgent must provide the target audience with the motive and means to 
act on the message that he conveys, and he must follow through with any threat 
or promise made in order to preserve future credibility. 
4. Deception 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines military deception as “those measures 
designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of 
evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's 
interests.”105 In other words, deception entails the deliberate misrepresentation of 
facts to the enemy decision maker in order to gain an operational advantage over 
him. Deception plays on the cognitive biases or weaknesses in enemy 
intelligence and decision making, and is typically used to lead the enemy to draw 
faulty conclusions about friendly force disposition, plans, and intentions—either in 
time, place, intensity, or objectives. As with all information-based activities, there 
should be some element of truth in deception activities, which may be verified 
through the enemy’s available information sources. 
In the context of insurgency, deception is a desirable but often difficult 
activity to pursue. As discussed early in this report, the primary advantage held 
by insurgents is their available intelligence on the disposition, status, and 
intentions of counterinsurgents due to the insurgents commingling with the 
general population. If the counterinsurgents are able to deceive the insurgents 
regarding the factors mentioned above, they may reduce the insurgents’ 
information advantage and combat effectiveness. Furthermore, if deception 
activities lead insurgents to take a desired course of action that forces them to 
operate in the open or in concentrated masses, it may dramatically increase the 
                                            
105 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. 
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counterinsurgents’ identification and kill capabilities by attaining surprise, and 
improving security, mass, or economy of force. 
Like the other information operations activities described above, deception 
requires highly detailed intelligence on the adversary, to include an 
understanding of his information gathering and decision-making processes. 
Deception may also require manipulation or denial of specific information 
channels in order to supply the false indicators to the adversary, which in itself 
can be a problem in rural insurgent environments. The above constraints lead 
one to conclude that if counterinsurgents had the level of intelligence and access 
required to pull off deceptions against the insurgents, they would probably not 
need to use deception in the first place. Still, deception is a powerful tool and 
worth pursuing in counterinsurgency strategies, particularly when the state does 
gain the upper hand in both information and popular support. 
5. Operations Security 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines operations security (OPSEC) as: 
A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other 
activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by 
adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile 
intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or 
pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to 
adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or 
reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions 
to adversary exploitation.106 
In other words, OPSEC is a process that denies information about friendly 
capabilities and intentions to the adversary. It identifies, controls, and protects 
generally unclassified evidence or indicators of the planning and execution of 
sensitive friendly activities. OPSEC indicators are created by detectable friendly 
actions or they may be found in open source information. The OPSEC process 
identifies threats, vulnerabilities to those threats, potential countermeasures, and 
weighs costs and risks of implementing specific countermeasures against 
                                            
106 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms. 
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specific vulnerabilities. Selected OPSEC measures are used to control an 
organization’s indicators in an effort to deny critical information to an adversary—
information that is required to counter friendly operations.  
In the context of insurgency, OPSEC is fundamentally a short cycle 
strategy that aims to increase the survivability of combat forces by reducing the 
information available to the opposition. To preserve their clandestine nature and 
to deny information to the state, insurgents practice OPSEC from the inception of 
the movement. Counterinsurgents face a different problem: on the one hand, 
they wish to deny operational indicators and intentions from the insurgents to 
reduce attrition in engagements with the enemy; on the other hand, they must 
have a visible and strong presence in the affected population in order to make 
the people feel more secure and more willing to support the state, which makes 
OPSEC difficult and reduces the insurgents’ intelligence burden. 
Despite this security dilemma, counterinsurgents can and must strive to 
practice OPSEC to the maximum extent possible. The process gets easier as 
popular support for the state grows and counterinsurgents are able to 
increasingly move out of cantonments, adding an element of maneuver and 
uncertainty to operations. The reverse happens to insurgents as they grow in 
size, because their organizational footprint gets too large to easily conceal from 
the counterinsurgents and it forces them to dedicate more resources and 
attention toward OPSEC measures. Perhaps the most attractive aspect of 
OPSEC to the counterinsurgent is that it, in theory, functions independent of 
insurgent actions; OPSEC as a deliberate process is completely under the state’s 
control and prioritization. 
 6. Electronic Warfare 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines electronic warfare (EW) as “any military action 
involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the 
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.”107 The three major 
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subdivisions within U.S. EW doctrine are electronic attack, electronic protection, 
and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack involves the use of 
electromagnetic energy weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with 
the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability, and 
includes activities such as jamming and electronic spoofing.108 Electronic 
protection involves passive and active measures designed to protect personnel, 
facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy electronic 
attacks.109 Electronic warfare support involves actions designed to search for, 
intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional 
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, 
targeting, planning and conduct of future operations.110 
In the context of insurgent conflict, EW may directly affect attrition, and 
indirectly affect mobilization. The extent to which EW applies at all, however, 
depends on the degree to which either side in the fight has or uses electronic 
means to support his efforts. If the combatants use systems that depend on the 
electromagnetic spectrum to sense, measure, transmit, process, and store 
information, there may be opportunities and vulnerabilities to address with EW. 
EW may be used to secure and maintain counterinsurgent’s control of the 
spectrum for purposes of command and control, intelligence gathering, combat, 
government administration, or public broadcasting. Further, EW may be used by 
counterinsurgents to deny use of the spectrum by insurgents for similar 
purposes, through a range of lethal and non-lethal options. 
7. Computer Network Operations 
U.S. Joint Doctrine describes computer network operations (CNO) as 
being comprised of separate but related components: computer network attack; 
computer network defense; and computer network exploitation.111 Computer 
                                            






network attack (CNA) includes operations intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves.112 CNA uses data, versus electronic 
pulses, to execute an attack through techniques such as planting malicious 
software code or harmful instructions in target computers and networks in order 
to achieve desired effects. Computer network defense (CND) includes defensive 
measures, which are intended to protect and defend information, computers, and 
networks from intentional or unintentional disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction.113 CND recognizes that environmental factors and internal security 
often pose challenges to friendly information systems, in addition to any hostile 
measures taken by the adversary, and must be factored into defensive 
measures. Computer network exploitation (CNE) is defined as “intelligence 
collection which gathers data from target or adversary automated information 
systems or networks.”114 In essence, CNE gathers information that is necessary 
to characterize and analyze adversary systems, in order to identify opportunities 
and vulnerabilities inherent in those systems.  
In the context of insurgency, CNO may directly affect attrition or 
mobilization functions. Similar to EW, the extent to which CNO applies in the 
conflict depends on the degree to which either side has or uses computer 
systems and networks to support his efforts. If the combatants employ computers 
and networks to gather, process, store, and share information, there may be 
opportunities and vulnerabilities to address with the three elements of CNO. CNO 
may be used to secure and advance counterinsurgent’s use of information 
systems and networks for the purposes of command and control, intelligence 
gathering, combat, administration, or public information. Or, CNO may be used 
by counterinsurgents to deny or exploit insurgents’ use of computers and 
networks for similar purposes. 
                                            





8. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) as “an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation 
of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in 
direct support of current and future operations.”115 As discussed at great length 
early in this report, intelligence is a fundamental need in fighting insurgencies 
and supports mobilization and attrition functions. Table 1 encapsulated what 
information is needed, when it is needed, and why it is needed to properly 
characterize and assess insurgent conflict. At that point, the report ignored the 
question of how to gain such information; this section addresses that critical 
question. ‘How’ to gain information is the function of ISR; ISR encompasses the 
means to gather data, fuse it, assess it, turn it into actionable intelligence, and 
finally, disseminate reports to individuals who need the information.  
When one thinks of ISR, one may naturally envision traditional intelligence 
collection methods employed by the U.S. in conventional conflict: imagery 
(IMINT), signals (SIGINT), electronic (ELINT), communications (COMINT), 
measurement and signatures (MASINT), or human intelligence (HUMINT) 
systems. While each of these methods remain valuable to varying degrees in the 
context of insurgency, and should be exploited if possible, they collectively have 
great difficulty obtaining the required information on clandestine insurgent 
organizations. This occurs primarily because the insurgents put a high premium 
on secrecy and minimizing observable organizational footprints by going 
‘underground’ or simply commingling with the general population. The 
counterinsurgent’s job in this case becomes a lot harder, as he needs to first 
identify friend from foe, and then collect information on the foe himself. This 
reality often renders traditional ISR capabilities incapable of delivering the 
information that is most needed. 
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To conquer the challenge of intelligence in counterinsurgency, one needs 
to rethink both the collection priorities and methods for performing ISR. First, a 
counterinsurgent needs to shed the conventional mindset when generating 
collection priorities; collection emphasis has to be placed on revealing the 
insurgent’s organizational infrastructure (key leadership, information channels, 
finances, etc.) rather than his fielded forces.116 Then, the collection strategy has 
to transform into a systematic process that is akin to the process of building 
evidence in a law enforcement case. As Charles Russell and Robert Hildner 
describe the task: 
Information about an insurgent movement . . . usually is acquired in 
small bits and pieces like those of a jigsaw puzzle. To obtain a clear 
and accurate picture of the insurgency, the various pieces of 
information must be fitted together in a number of patterns, which 
are adjusted or rearranged (collated) on the basis of continuous 
inputs of new information. Without this accurate and 
comprehensive picture, counterinsurgency programs and resources 
cannot be developed or focused to achieve maximum results.117 
The small bits and pieces of information described above may come from 
traditional ISR sources, but more likely, they will emerge from interactions 
between counterinsurgents and the population. In order to generate such 
information leads, the counterinsurgents must first provide a relatively secure 
environment in which average citizens may be willing to reveal what they know 
without fear of insurgent retribution.118 Furthermore, counterinsurgents must 
build information networks that tap into many non-traditional or informal sources, 
such as local civil administration, law enforcement, hospitals, banks, etc. 
Essentially, any public or private program that requires an individual to identify 
himself to receive goods or services must be considered a valuable intelligence 
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resource. Furthermore, when local citizens wish to come forward with 
information, there must be a local security official there to receive it.  
In order to exploit information, however, counterinsurgents need to invest 
in mechanisms to process and share it among various sources in a timely and 
secure manner. As Leites and Wolf note, “An effective system requires not just 
collection of information from multiple sources . . . but also processing, 
classifying, evaluating, storing, and retrieving information.”119 Investment in 
public information systems, communications networks, and training of 
intelligence personnel may help in this task; however, even low-technology 
solutions such as paper records and files are useful. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that insurgents target public officials, offices, and records banks for intimidation 
or destruction early in their campaign—not for their objective value as public 
infrastructure, but for their potential intelligence value to counterinsurgents. 
Once insurgent infrastructures are identified, traditional ISR methods are 
extremely valuable for counterinsurgents to track the insurgents’ movements, 
activities, and intentions. It is hard to prescribe a generic template that identifies 
the specific ISR capabilities that are most important to counterinsurgency, as that 
list is situation-dependent. However, in most cases it is useful to have wide-area 
long-dwell observation capabilities to monitor specific locations or lines of 
communications for patterns of insurgent activity or to provide general indications 
and warning, plus an ability to conduct all-weather day-night detailed 
reconnaissance to support tactical operations. Along with the above capabilities, 
one must also have secure communications to relay data among intelligence 
agents and the ability to quickly correlate, fuse, and assess observations. 
9. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) 
Systems 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines command, control, communications, and 
computer (C4) systems as “integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, 
organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications 
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designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the 
range of military operations.”120 Without belaboring the topic, it is sufficient to say 
that counterinsurgents must have a trusted network of communications between 
layers of command and functional elements, as well as a well-integrated 
command and control structure with which they may exercise unified 
counterinsurgent operations. The design of communications systems such that 
they provide adequate reach, capacity, and robustness to support often very 
remote counterinsurgency operations is a particular concern. Efficient and 
effective C4 systems support counterinsurgents by maximizing their mobilization 
and combat performance. Obviously, counterinsurgents should make every effort 
to deny insurgents the same capabilities or otherwise reduce their effectiveness 
through other information operations capabilities described in this report. 
10. Civil-Military Operations 
U.S. Joint Doctrine defines civil-military operations (CMO) as “the activities 
of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between 
military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and 
authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational 
area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve 
operational US objectives.” 121 CMO is another concept that universally applies to 
domestic insurgencies, despite the U.S.-centric definition provided here. In CMO, 
military forces may perform activities that are normally the responsibility of local 
government, and such activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to 
other military actions—or even in the absence of other military operations. The 
doctrine and utility of CMO could be discussed at great lengths in a separate 
thesis; what is most important to consider in this paper is the relationship of CMO 
to the other tools of information systems and operations. 
CMO will always carry a psychological overtone—whether it is 
acknowledged or not. Simply put, the military does things for a reason; in the 
                                            




context of counterinsurgency, CMO is done to support the ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaign by providing necessary public services either in support of, or in the 
absence of, other government agencies. CMO in this light is intended to support 
counterinsurgents’ mobilization efforts by assisting public preferences in favor of 
the government. CMO thus becomes an element of the influence program, which 
may also include public information and PSYOP efforts. Each one of these efforts 
deals in the truth and looks to gain the understanding, trust, and cooperation of 
foreign target audiences, but each pursues these objectives in different ways.  
To be mutually supportive and not destructive, CMO, public information, 
and PSYOP activities must be coordinated throughout counterinsurgent planning 
and execution processes. Although their messages may be different, they must 
not contradict one another or the credibility, and the mobilization benefit, of all 
three will be lost. Although each operation has specific audiences, information 
will often overlap between audiences—which makes de-confliction of messages 
critical. When synchronized effectively, public information efforts pass positive 
information regarding CMO activities to appropriate audiences through the 
media. Further, if effectively coordinated, CMO reinforces PSYOP efforts to 
control the population, gain support for the government, and hopefully, reduce 
popular support to insurgents. 
11. Summary 
In summary, there is a wide array of information-based activities available 
to support counterinsurgency efforts. The intents and effects of these activities 
are varied: some are geared to improve counterinsurgent mobilization, while 
others aim to reduce insurgent mobilization; and, some are intended to improve 
counterinsurgent combat effectiveness, while others try to reduce insurgent 
combat capabilities. Table 7 summarizes the tools of information systems and 
operations presented in this paper. For each tool, the table identifies the 
dynamics and parameters of insurgency that the tool primarily impacts.  
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Public Information √ √ √ √ 
Public Diplomacy √ √  √ 
Psychological 
Operations √ √ √ √ 
Deception  √   
Operations Security  √   
Electronic Warfare √ √   
Computer Network 








√ √   
Civil-Military 
Operations √ √  √ 
Table 7.   Information-Based Tools for Counterinsurgency 
The most important point to remember from this discussion is that 
information systems and operations work best when they are planned and 
synchronized under a unified and holistic counterinsurgency strategy. This way, 
the counterinsurgent maximizes synergy between information activities and 
avoids the pitfalls of not coordinating efforts. Furthermore, despite the fact that so 
much emphasis is placed in this report on the information dimension of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, one must also remember that other 
dimensions of this type of conflict, such as military forces, governance, 
economics, and social matters are still important. Information-based activities 
alone will not defeat insurgents, and the tools must be balanced and blended 
with the other elements of the state’s response to the conflict. 
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D. INFORMATION WARFARE IN NEPAL 
Returning once again to the task of finding an effective counterinsurgency 
strategy for Nepal, this section surveys the conflict in terms of the tools of 
information systems and operations as described in previous sections. The 
intentions of this section are to reveal the extent to which the tools are being 
employed by the combatants in Nepal, to highlight significant elements of Nepal’s 
information battlespace that shape the tools’ employment or feasibility, and to 
assess effectiveness of the tools on the conflict to date.  
1. Public Information 
a. Current Situation 
Perhaps the most dramatic element of the Emergency declared by 
King Gyanendra on 1 February 2005 was the curtailing of citizens’ constitutional 
rights to freedom of expression and freedom of press for the purpose of 
establishing peace and security in the Kingdom. The King’s actions, such as the 
‘shutting off’ of Nepal’s telecommunications and Internet services to the outside 
world, strike one at once as ultimately self-defeating measures. In a conflict 
shaped by natural and assisted popular preferences, it is hard to see how this 
tactic could possibly move public opinion in favor of the government and away 
from Maoist insurgents. In fact, the parallels to the Maoist tactic of suppressing 
alternative viewpoints and public discourse are incredibly ironic. 
Since the dawn of constitutional monarchy in 1990, a robust and 
diverse independent media flourished in Nepal. Newspapers, television, FM 
radio, and a nascent Internet industry have represented a wide spectrum of 
political thought in the country. However, through measure after measure since 1 
February, the government increased the scope and depth of restrictions on 
personal and press freedoms: bans on private FM radio news broadcast; bans on 
private print media publishing news content; elimination of government 
advertising in private media; armed clashes with and arrests of protesters; 
selective blocking of Internet sites and services; and severe restrictions on public 
use of mobile phone service. The once vibrant media has been reduced to strict 
 95
reporting of government-furnished news stories and broadcasting mundane 
entertainment programming.122 
In response to these moves, affected elements of Nepal’s society 
have begun popular protests and brought legal filings against the government. 
Journalists, political parties, dislocated and homeless war victims, student 
groups, and most recently, civil administration employees have joined the battle 
to restore basic freedoms that are constitutionally guaranteed. The chain of 
popular protest unleashed since the 1 February moves is evidence of the 
psychological cost of the policy and has negatively impacted counterinsurgency 
efforts. Furthermore, when one considers the physical and opportunity costs of 
deploying thousands of RNA soldiers and police throughout media outlets and on 
the streets across Nepal solely to enforce censorship and public obedience, the 
King’s curtailment of civil rights can only be seen as a destructive in the calculus 
of insurgency. Clearly, securing villages or fighting Maoists would be a more 
useful way to spend such valuable resources. 
Whether the King’s actions are strictly legal or not, perceptions of 
his actions are what matters most, and he has a growing problem with legitimacy 
that affects all government institutions and actions. Put simply, a large segment 
of Nepal’s society and international support has lost trust in the government’s 
intentions to restore democracy to the country. While some Nepalis continue to 
support censorship measures as necessary sacrifices in time of war, an objective 
analysis of the situation highlights greater losses than gains for the government 
as a result of censorship.  
More importantly, since insurgency is by definition a zero-sum gain, 
the King’s losses theoretically translate into Maoist gains. It is difficult to evaluate 
at this point whether the Maoists have been able to capitalize on the opportunity 
to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of the average Nepali, as there is no 
objective means to investigate and report such matters while the country is under 
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state censorship. Through Maoist interviews with foreign press and 
communiqués, however, it is clear that Chairman Prachanda and chief ideologue 
Bhattari have attempted to exploit the King’s actions as evidence of his dictatorial 
intentions. The Maoists were quick to call on mainstream political parties and the 
general population to form a unified front with them against the King.  
Maoist ideology has always placed high importance on the role of 
propaganda in the “People’s War”. This holds true in Nepal today, but the 
Maoists have limited access to mass media, even before the King’s 1 February 
move, and the Maoists have few positive messages to bring to the average 
Nepali. The Maoists claim to be fighting against the injustice and disparity of the 
downtrodden masses in Nepal, but their actions betray the positive social agenda 
they propose. Official Nepali and international sources report almost daily of 
Maoist transgressions: destruction of infrastructure, such as roads and power or 
water projects; abduction of children or government officials; disruption of transit 
through highway strikes; and indiscriminate bombings of people and property. 
The most heinous incident to date, which garnered immediate and widespread 
national and international condemnation, was a landmine attack on a bus in a 
rural district in July 2005 that killed 38 and injured over 70.123 
Additionally, the Maoists themselves routinely restrict free speech 
and freedom of the press in areas under their control. In just one recent example, 
the Maoists banned sales, distribution and reporting of a popular daily newspaper 
in eastern Nepal, claiming that the newspaper has been carrying out a media 
campaign to malign rebel leadership.124 Maoists often accuse reporters of being 
spies for the Army and respond with a range of tools: censorship; threats of 
force; abduction and torture; and killings.125 These examples highlight the plight 
of independent public information sources, as they frequently become the targets 
of repression by both the Maoists and the government. More importantly, the 
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incidents expose the inherent contradiction between Maoist goals of personal 
freedom and their actions to restrict such thought and speech.  
The lesson for the Maoists in such situations is that people may be 
disenfranchised and disheartened by the government, but they will not 
automatically support the Maoists. The Maoists’ lofty rhetoric and social ideals 
are not met with positive action in the field; in fact, the Maoists’ own actions are 
their worst image problem. These factors ultimately limit the gains that the 
Maoists can make from missteps by the government; no amount of propaganda 
can change this reality. 
b. Insights 
The sphere of public information and discourse in Nepal is in 
disarray and is largely at a stalemate, just as the situation on the military front. 
Since insurgency is inherently a contest for popular support, there is strong 
potential for the use (or misuse) of public information to affect the outcome of the 
conflict. Of the many elements of insurgency, public information may have the 
most direct connection to the hearts, minds, and, hopefully, the actions of the 
target population. Additionally, public information is one of the few elements in 
the conflict that the government has complete control over, in terms of its choices 
of methods and timing of actions.  
There is great potential to rebuild popular trust in Nepal’s 
government, its policies, and its institutions through the proper harnessing of 
public information. Clearly, improving trust in the state is essential to advance the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of Nepal’s counterinsurgency efforts. The 
government may take constructive steps to swing popular support in favor of the 
government—or at least regain the ground lost after 1 February. Obviously, the 
first step in this process is to restore personal and press freedom. That act alone 
will not undo all the damage from 1 February, nor will it build an effective tool to 
support future counterinsurgency efforts. The government may take further steps 
to engage with credentialed reporters and open access to positive as well as 
negative information in the countryside and the cities. By doing so, the 
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government may reclaim the moral high ground and preempt or expose Maoist 
propaganda in domestic and foreign press reports. 
2. Public Diplomacy 
a. Current Situation 
Nepal has a history of isolation within South Asia and with the world 
in general. It has always wished to handle domestic matters without undue 
external influence or interference, and the current crisis certainly reaffirms that 
wish—at least from the King’s perspective. Despite this wish, Nepal must pay 
attention to, and attempt to influence, foreign attitudes due to its dependence on 
foreign financial and military aid. Nepal’s official relations with foreign donors and 
supporters have been strained for the past few years, dating back to the King’s 
first declaration of emergency in 2002; this strain mostly is due to foreign 
perceptions that the present government of Nepal lacks legitimacy. The royal 
moves in February 2005 only deepened the problem, and led to widespread 
suspension of foreign assistance. It is no surprise that Nepal’s formal diplomacy 
and public diplomacy are now focused on explaining the rationale for the 
emergency takeover and its restrictive measures, and attempt to build support for 
the King’s plans to improve security and governance in the country.  
Unfortunately for the King, the opposition politicians and civil-
society organizations have developed a parallel public diplomacy effort. These 
parties are trying to influence foreign people and their leaders to cease support to 
the King, and to pressure him into restoring multi-party democracy and full civil 
rights. Furthermore, the Maoists are using foreign media to highlight bickering 
between the King and politicians, and promote their own interest. Recent 
examples, such as a protest letter sent by the opposition parties to the U.N.,126 
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and direct appeals for U.N. mediation by NGOs127 and Maoist Chairman 
Prachanda,128 illustrate the competition for influence over foreign audiences. 
b. Insights 
In-fighting between the monarchy and politicians, and criticism of 
emergency-related policies, have dominated foreign attention at the expense of 
the real problems in the country: security, governance, and development. Two 
important consequences follow from this state of affairs: first, until political 
legitimacy is restored to the government, foreign donors will be very reluctant to 
provide desperately needed aid to Nepal; and second, to the extent that foreign 
audiences perceive continual political bickering as ignorance of Nepal’s real 
problems, it lends legitimacy to certain aspects of the Maoist platform.  
In the first case, reduction in aid limits the government’s ability to 
improve conditions and gain support in the rural villages, as well as its capability 
to combat the Maoists in the field. In the second case, increased legitimacy of 
their cause improves Maoists’ relative standing in the general population and 
directly fuels their recruiting in the field. The best move in public diplomacy is 
probably to first resolve the political impasse between the King and the 
politicians, and then to engage in a unified campaign to regain foreign support in 
order to meet the security and development needs of the people. 
3. Psychological Operations 
a. Current Situation 
It is clear from the previous two sections that the Nepali public and 
foreign audiences are under a barrage of influence attempts through either 
formal or informal means, by both the government and the Maoists. It is less 
clear, due to the dearth of independent reporting from Nepal, the extent to which 
these influence methods are affecting the actual behavior of the general 
population. Furthermore, there is little evidence available to examine specific 
                                            
127 Nepalnews.com, “Rights groups, NGOs appeal for UN mediation,” 
http://www.nepalnews.com. 
128 Nepalnews.com, “Maoists declare three-month long ceasefire,” 
http://www.nepalnews.com. 
 100
PSYOP efforts that may be ongoing by the government or the Maoists to affect 
specific leaders, operators, or supporters in each other’s ranks. Despite this, it is 
possible to identify general PSYOP themes the government is pursuing on the 
psychological battlefield in Nepal (Table 8). 
Counterinsurgent PSYOP Themes 
Current Emergency is necessary to restore order, and security is improving 
Hindu duty requires good governance by administrators to all citizens 
21-Point security and development program to  meet social and economic needs 
State promises to restore Parliamentary democracy and elections within 3 years 
State continues to invest in development projects throughout country 
Maoists are exploiting low castes and ethnics simply to gain political power 
Maoists claim a ‘class struggle,’ but it is a fabrication of Maoist leadership 
Maoists are ignorant or otherwise revisionist with respect to Mao’s principles 
Maoists lack of a coherent plan for governance, and would not share power 
Maoists claim equality, but lack representation of women and ethnics in leadership 
Maoists continually destroy desperately needed infrastructure 
Maoists grossly violate human rights 
Table 8.   Counterinsurgent PSYOPS Themes in Nepal 
 
b. Insights 
One of the primary challenges facing the government in its PSYOP 
efforts is a lack of credible information channels to reach target audiences. 
Furthermore, the plethora of local languages, dialects, and ethnicities, as well as 
widespread illiteracy found in conflict areas make it difficult to establish 
consistent and effective themes and deliver them to the people. For these 
reasons alone, the government should seriously reevaluate its policies of 
restricting independent print, broadcast, and electronic media. The government 
lacks the linguistic and cultural nuances necessary to deliver a credible message 
to many of the ‘micro-cultures’ peppered throughout the hills and valleys of 
Nepal. A vibrant and supportive media may be able to provide inroads to such 
isolated areas.  
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The above issue deals with designing and delivering messages to 
the target audiences; the other components of the influence process require a 
capability and a willingness to act on threats or promises made to the target 
audience. To be effective, it is not enough for the King, the politicians, or the 
security forces to make statements—they must affect the physical reality in the 
target areas. If security and governance do not accompany psychological 
appeals to affected peoples, or the security forces cannot inflict punishment on 
Maoist operatives, PSYOP efforts will likely result in even less support by the 
intended audiences or the loss of credibility. 
4. Deception 
a. Current Situation 
There is scant published evidence of formal government deception 
activities ongoing in Nepal. This is not to say that such activity is not happening, 
but it cannot be confirmed or denied due to the lack of independent reporting. 
Politics and governance in Nepal have historically been marked with a perception 
of duplicity, in the form of promises made to people in order to meet immediate 
needs, and then broken once the need has passed.129 One may argue that this 
statement simply reflects the nature of politics and politicians anywhere; from the 
perspective of a Nepali villager, however, especially an illiterate person with no 
conception of the political wrangling inherent in a vibrant democracy, it reinforces 
the belief that government deception is commonplace. This issue matters very 
much, as it is a fundamental recruitment theme for the Maoists, and it must be 
answered through improvements in governance and fair delivery of public 
services to the affected population. 
The question with respect to fighting the Maoists is whether the 
government or the RNA is deliberately deceiving—or is capable of deceiving—
Maoist leaders or forces? Maoist leadership has proven to be very resilient to 
penetration and manipulation by the King or the politicians, probably due to the 
fact that senior Maoists are shrewd politicians themselves and will not fall into a 
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deceptive trap. At the field level, particularly in the rural areas, the freedom of 
movement and relative information advantage of the Maoists undoubtedly make 
it difficult for the RNA to conduct deception operations. The U.S. Defense 
Attaché in Kathmandu describes the RNA’s operational posture as mainly 
“movement to contact, due to a poor intelligence capability,”130 which implies, 
among other things, that the RNA either is unable or unwilling to use deception at 
this time to dictate the terms on which they engage the Maoists. 
In contrast, the Maoists have demonstrated a capacity and 
willingness to engage in deceptive activities against the state. At the strategic 
level, it is widely believed that previous ceasefires and peace negotiations were, 
in reality, efforts to buy time in order to recover from tactical losses or reverse 
adverse political trends. Furthermore, despite putting forth a list of political 
demands at the onset of the insurgency, the Maoists have yet to articulate and 
commit to “a coherent economic, political, and social vision for the country.”131 
Whether this demonstrates a shrewd political strategy or it is a deliberate 
strategic deception to deflect attention from their intended re-ordering of society 
is uncertain, but the Maoists are not challenged on it. At the operational and 
tactical levels, the Maoists have a natural advantage of information concerning 
their identities and movements, which leads as a minimum to tactical surprise in 
terms of timing, location, and strength of attack. The Maoists keenly avoid 
introducing uniformed and armed militants into areas under government control; 
rather, they use unarmed cadres—virtually indistinguishable from average 
citizens—to complete recruitment and intelligence activities and only call upon 
uniformed members when resistance arises. 
b. Insights 
The government’s opportunities and abilities to employ the tool of 
deception against specific Maoist targets appear to be limited at this time due to 
poor intelligence and/or poor control of information channels that reach Maoist 
                                            
130 Scott Taylor, electronic communication to author, 27 July 2005. 
131 Saubhagya Shah, “A Himalayan Red Herring?” in Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s 
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decision makers. This situation may change, especially if/when security and 
intelligence improve in conflict-affected areas, and the RNA should continuously 
strive to exploit any opportunities to use deception in advance of tactical 
offensives. Furthermore, since the Maoists have demonstrated the ability to 
gather high resolution information on government activities, and the patience and 
wherewithal to mass forces and attack from hide spots, the government must 
constantly assess the indicators observed, or lack thereof, in conflict areas. 
5. Operations Security 
a. Current Situation 
Available reports indicate that the government has a genuine and 
continual operations security problem, as security force patrols and cantonments 
are routine targets of Maoist ambushes. A primary reason for the government’s 
imposition of strict media censorship is to control irresponsible and untimely 
reporting of security movements and operations. At best, such measures appear 
to be too little, too late to stop the flow of information to the enemy; the chances 
are very low that reporters in Nepal will ‘out-scoop’ the Maoist intelligence 
network. More likely, situational factors and the government’s deliberate 
strategies and tactics currently make it very hard to control critical indicators, thus 
making them observable by Maoists, reporters, and citizens alike. Beyond 
censorship, however, there is little open reporting of any formal government 
program to control its operational indicators at the source. 
The Maoists, on the other hand, are either more adept at OPSEC, 
are more motivated to practice it for survival reasons, or are more able to do the 
function because of their local information advantage. The Maoists take 
advantage of their operating space by widely dispersing forces, carefully 
selecting and preparing engagement areas, planning escape routes, and 
monitoring security force activities. The Maoists are also brutally harsh on 
informants who reveal critical information to government agents; summary 
executions, torture, and forced labor are just a few methods of controlling the 
behavior of the citizens in their base areas, which serves to protect information. 
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b. Insights 
The government’s OPSEC challenges stem from at least four 
factors: the Maoists’ pervasive intelligence apparatus, particularly within and 
around rural villages; the government’s deliberate concentration of forces in order 
to provide force protection; the government’s limited strategic and tactical 
mobility due to topography, poor infrastructure and lack of airborne transportation 
assets; and, the government’s lack of active public support in affected areas. 
Some of these factors are structural constraints, such as topography and mobility 
resource; these factors can only be conquered in the long run through large scale 
infrastructure development and investment in mobility resources. Others factors, 
however, are dynamic and may be affected as a consequence of interrelated 
counterinsurgent strategies. It would seem that effective government OPSEC in 
Nepal must begin with training in the concept, followed by incremental 
implementation of measures to control indicators at the source. As conflict 
progresses and government forces are able to gain popular support and 
operational flexibility, the OPSEC situation may improve rapidly. 
6. Electronic Warfare 
a. Current Situation 
There is little evidence of significant EW efforts being pursued by 
either the Nepalese government or the Maoists. It is known, however, that the 
Maoists use wireless telephones and radios to coordinate activities and 
communicate with echelons of leadership. Further, Maoists have employed 
command detonators for landmines or IEDs (materials that were captured in 
raids on the RNA).132 The government uses these same capabilities and would 
like to obtain more advanced equipment from foreign suppliers.  
b. Insights 
Difficult topography, limited resources, poor infrastructure, and lack 
of skills and training constrain this area of the conflict. Certainly, if it can obtain 
equipment and training, the counterinsurgents could make good use of electronic 
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 105
surveillance, direction finding, and jamming capabilities to locate, identify, 
monitor, and if desired, deny Maoist communications to support friendly 
operations. In lieu of such capabilities, the government’s approach has been to 
monitor and control electromagnetic resources at the source. For example, one 
of the actions taken as a result of the 1 February 2005 emergency declaration 
was to suspend pre- and post-paid mobile telephone service, and was not 
resumed until subscribers re-registered and filed identity documents.133 At the 
present time, regulation of subscriber-based services is probably the best 
solution available, but it does not yet solve the problem of unrestricted radio-
frequency handsets used in remote areas. 
7. Computer Network Operations 
a. Current Situation 
Although the Internet and modern computer systems and networks 
are relatively new to Nepal, the government, the Maoists, NGOs, and private 
entities have established important capabilities in the area and increasingly rely 
on information systems and the Internet for a host of security, administrative, and 
business functions. Internet services are mainly available in the Kathmandu 
Valley and a few other urban centers scattered throughout the country. 
Environmental factors such as topography, limited infrastructure, illiteracy, and 
poor technical skills, however, constrain the spread of networks in Nepal. 
Nonetheless, computers and networks are powerful tools that link critical 
elements of Nepali society with each other and the outside world. 
The importance of telecommunications, network infrastructure, and 
information systems is not lost on either the government or the Maoists. The 
government has dedicated significant resources to building wireless and fiber-
optic communications networks, radiating outward from Kathmandu to other 
urban and rural regions. Foreign investment and aid in this area has helped, 
including innovative projects such as an Australian effort to install wireless 
networks in high mountainous regions to help otherwise isolated farmers to 
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communicate families and conduct trade.134 As the government builds such 
access points in rural areas, however, they must either dedicate badly needed 
security resources to guard them or otherwise leave them unprotected. In either 
case, the Maoists routinely target and physically destroy radio transmitter sites, 
power stations, and media centers.135 There is little evidence, however, of Maoist 
cyber-attacks on these assets. 
Another target of both government and Maoist attacks is the 
information residing on the computer systems and networks. Because of the 
rising importance of Internet communications via web sites, electronic mail, or 
voice-over-IP, the government has recently mounted concerted efforts to monitor, 
restrict, or deny the use of these tools. Reporters Without Borders has reported 
that the RNA’s Directorate of Public Relations actively blocks web sites, closes 
discussion forums, monitors personal e-mail, and threatens bloggers.136 The 
RNA claimed that a dozen of the 23 news sites blocked are linked to the 
Maoists.137 The Maoists use a counter-information strategy of destroying public 
records and information systems in areas under their control. While many of 
these records are paper files, electronic records are targeted when they are 
present. 
b. Insights 
From a tactical standpoint, government blockades of web sites are 
only marginally effective in controlling the Maoists’ use of cyberspace. Maoists 
have the ability to communicate with sympathizers in India, either through 
telephone or couriers crossing the open border with Nepal, who can easily and 
quickly spread messages across the world through service providers there or in 
other nations. Nonetheless, if Nepali service providers or web sites knowingly 
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advocate and directly support attacks on government forces or civilians, the 
government should continue to selectively deny such activity if it can. 
From a strategic standpoint, the government may view expansion 
of internet access and open exchange of information across the medium in the 
same positive light as freedom of expression in other media. It is to the 
government’s long-term benefit to harness, rather than inhibit, growth and use of 
cyberspace. Expansion of network infrastructure, whether it is wired or wireless, 
is a key enabler for a host of security and administrative activities. The most 
important thing is for the government to build a high degree of control, protection, 
and robustness in the network so that it can be employed when most needed.  
Furthermore, Maoist destruction of public records and information 
systems is a prime example of deliberate efforts that will be made in order to 
reduce information available to government. The government must take steps to 
preserve this critical data since it is essential to support intelligence and 
administration functions. Wherever computers and networks are used to support 
these efforts, CND measures such as backups, networking, and redundancy 
could help administrators retain and control identity records. 
8. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
a. Current Situation 
The government’s intelligence network is extremely poor, except in 
urban areas. The security forces have few resources dedicated to the intelligence 
task and do not share information well among different elements. The 
government’s situation is encapsulated by a particularly egregious intelligence 
failure that led to a huge Maoist attack in the zonal headquarter of Karnali during 
November 2002. In the attack, five to six thousand Maoists are said to have 
assaulted the security headquarters, resulting in about 40 security force 
casualties, the theft of money and arms, and the destruction of 36 government 
offices.138 Prakash Raj describes the most disturbing aspects of this particular 
attack: 
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There were reports one week earlier that an attack was about to 
take place.. . . however, the local administration did not know that a 
force of five to ten thousand insurgents was gathering for an attack 
on the town. Khalanga is not situated in a densely populated area 
and it should not have been difficult to know about unusual activity 
in the neighboring villages before the attack.139 
What is most telling about this attack was the inability or 
unwillingness to identify even large-scale insurgent activity in a relatively benign 
environment close to a major cantonment area. If advance reports were 
available, why were they not shared, corroborated, assessed, and acted upon by 
security personnel? This example makes it is clear that sensing and detecting 
insurgent indicators is only a part of the Nepal’s ISR challenge; the other part of 
the problem is analyzing and sharing this information. 
Without belaboring the point, it is obvious that the Maoist 
intelligence network is pervasive and effective in rural areas and, in some cases, 
within government strongholds as well. The key to Maoist intelligence is its 
coercive grip on local populations, which intimidates the people into revealing 
government activities and informants. With effective local control, Maoists are 
free to position observers in key points of approach, where they can easily 
monitor and relay any security force activity to higher echelons of command. 
Further, as their cadres move into areas and establish de facto governments, 
Maoist agents are widely integrated into every aspect of village administration. 
b. Insights 
Due to Nepal’s difficult topography, generally poor infrastructure, 
and limited resources, the counterinsurgents must carefully prioritize its ISR 
requirements and allocate its limited ISR assets accordingly. As the example of 
the Karnali zone attack plainly illustrated, there is a huge need in Nepal for low-
cost, wide area, and long-dwell or permanent surveillance capabilities as well as 
an even greater need to properly assess and share information among all 
counterinsurgent elements. A few alternative solutions immediately come to 
mind: small unmanned aerial vehicles; unattended wireless-networked sensors; 
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and village-level human intelligence. Further, a redefinition of intelligence 
information is necessary: any piece of information that distinguishes insurgents 
from non-insurgents and reveals indicators of insurgent infrastructure is critical 
no matter what the source is. Sharing information among all elements of the 
security forces and the local administration is essential to make this process 
productive. Despite Nepal’s limited real-time intelligence capabilities, there is 
great potential in the conduct of integrated analysis that tracks the patterns and 
locations of insurgent activities over time. This process would be useful in 
creating models to understand insurgent priorities and trends, to prioritize 
government ISR tasking, and to project effective security force deployments and 
operations. 
9. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) 
Systems 
a. Current Situation 
The Maoists are known to have a highly unified and centralized 
command and control structure; they communicate through Internet, 
messengers, and wireless radios. There is also some evidence that Maoists use 
quite innovative command and control tactics, such as communicating in an 
unintelligible language,140 which evokes memories of the U.S. military’s use of 
native American ‘wind talkers’ in World War II against the Japanese. The 
government currently employs a centralized command and control structure, but 
it is attempting to decentralize the military somewhat by building up zonal and 
regional command elements. This report already discussed the unification of 
security elements under the command of the RNA in 2003, but it is uncertain how 
effective that arrangement has been in practice. The government employs secure 
communications and computer systems, and relies on support from the U.S., 
U.K., China, and India in these areas. 
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b. Insights 
The RNA’s plan to decentralize command elements seems to be an 
effective strategy to push forces closer and more permanently to the areas where 
they are most needed. Smaller, more numerous units increase the presence and 
visibility of counterinsurgents with respect to the population, but they must also 
be coordinated to ensure their actions are consistent and appropriate with wider 
strategies. Obviously, no matter what the command arrangements are, the 
counterinsurgents must have the means to defend their immediate surroundings 
and they must have C4 systems that provide secure and robust capabilities to 
coordinate activities and needs among all echelons of command. Investment in 
mobile networking infrastructure and low-cost secure mobile handsets would 
seem to support this goal.  
10. Civil-Military Operations 
a. Current Situation 
As noted earlier in this report, one of the root causes of Nepal’s 
present crisis is the lack of fair and effective governance in rural areas, which 
compounds inherent social and economic problems there. Despite hundreds of 
millions of dollars in foreign development aid, poverty and backwardness persist 
in a majority of rural Nepal. A history of corrupt, ineffective, and unjust local 
officials and administrators led to the problems there, and points to the 
importance of fixing governance issues before injecting large amounts of 
development money into such areas. 
The breakdown of governance fuelled support to the Maoist 
movement, which in turn drove remaining vestiges of administration out of many 
areas. Maoist destruction of most state-sponsored or NGO development projects 
ensures that people in conflict areas remain without even basic public services. 
In areas where the government stamps out insurgent activity, CMO may fill the 
immediate vacuum of government services on which the affected population 
depends. The RNA has taken on numerous CMO efforts in an attempt to not only 
improve the local population’s lives, but also to provide necessary infrastructures 
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such as roads and bridges in remote areas that support future security and 
government purposes.141 The critical test of effectiveness, however, has been 
how long the project stands following the RNA’s departure. Infrastructure is a 
very popular and easy target for Maoist attacks, to the tune of an estimated $5 
billion U.S. as of 2003.142 
b. Insights 
CMO is not in itself an information operation; however, the 
psychological by-product of successful CMO efforts may generate improvements 
in several other information-based activities, such as public information, OPSEC, 
and ISR. Establishment of necessary public services is a safe, efficient, and 
effective means to reintroduce government control and influence in affected 
areas; but, these benefits can only be realized if the projects continue in the face 
of Maoist activity. Therefore a high priority should be placed on protecting as well 
as publicizing CMO successes. 
11. Summary 
This section presented a wide-ranging survey of the Maoist insurgency 
and counterinsurgency, with respect to each side’s use of the tools of information 
systems and operations. In each of the ten areas, both sides engage in 
information operations, but to varying degrees and with varying effectiveness. 
The recurring theme that emerges from this survey is that the tools of information 
are interdependent, and must be addressed in totality to maximize their impact in 
counterinsurgency. It is clear that the government must improve upon certain 
foundational elements in order to succeed in the information realm: creation of 
credible information channels; provision of basic security; consistent and fair 
follow-through on messages; increased use and sharing of non-traditional ISR; 
and expansion of secure communications networks. The next chapter 
demonstrates the impact of these findings on Nepal’s counterinsurgency efforts. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes the most promising of the information-based 
strategies and tactics that were introduced in the last chapter, in terms of their 
relative impacts on the insurgency model presented in this paper. Based on the 
findings of this analysis, the chapter assesses the implementation challenges 
unique to the situation in Nepal. Finally, the chapter offers constructive means for 
the US to support the most promising information operations approaches. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS & OPERATIONS ALTERNATIVES 
As a reminder of the earlier assessment of Nepal’s conflict, this paper 
proposed that the primary challenge for the government today is how to improve 
its counterinsurgency performance in the rural fight, while simultaneously 
preserving its decisive edge in the cities. Then, the paper offered a set of short 
and long cycle strategies, which are either insurgent- or state-focused, that aim 
to influence the parameters and dynamics of mobilization and attrition. Finally, 
the paper identified a set of information systems and operations tools that 
generically impact insurgency, and specifically assessed the current situation in 
Nepal. The most promising information-based tools to affect the dynamics in 
Nepal, based on the subjective assessment discussed in the previous chapter, 
are listed in Table 9 below. This list represents the author’s assessment of ‘bang 
for the buck,’ in terms of direct and opportunity costs versus operational gain in 
terms of the dynamics affected in the insurgency model. Obviously, these are 
open to other interpretations, but for now these serve to illustrate the overall 
power of information in counterinsurgency, versus a strictly ‘military solution.’ 
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Public Information √ √ √ √ 
Public Diplomacy √ √  √ 
Psychological 
Operations √ √ √ √ 
Deception  √   
Operations Security  √   
Electronic Warfare √ √   
Computer Network 








√ √   
Civil-Military 
Operations √ √  √ 
Table 9.   Promising Information-Based Tools for Nepal’s Counterinsurgency 
Within the resolution of insurgency model presented in this paper, it is only 
possible to explore the gross effect of these information-based tools on the 
mobilization and attrition parameters and dynamics. Furthermore, additional 
assumptions must be made regarding implementation of these tools in the 
model: first, the model projects the end product of well-integrated and 
coordinated information activities, thus ignoring the significant ‘learning curve’ 
that must usually occur; second, the model projects the intended result of the 
tools in the absence of active adversary counter-action (i.e., this represents a 
‘best-case’ scenario); and finally, the model assumes that related information 
operations activities are also implemented as enablers to these primary tools. 
With these caveats attached, the projected impacts on the parameters of the 
insurgency model are listed in Table 10. 
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xr0 Size of insurgent organization: rural 0.043 0.043   
xu0 Size of insurgent organization: urban 0.015 0.015   
yr0 Size of counterinsurgent organization: 
rural 
  0.085 0.085 
yu0 Size of counterinsurgent organization: 
urban 
  0.060 0.060 
ar Insurgent growth parameter: rural Med Low   
au Insurgent growth parameter: urban Low Low   
br Counterinsurgent growth parameter: 
rural 
  Low Med 
br Counterinsurgent growth parameter: 
urban 
  Med Med 
mr’ Counterinsurgent combat 
effectiveness parameter: rural 
  Med Med 
mu’ Counterinsurgent combat 
effectiveness parameter: urban 
  High High 
nr’ Insurgent combat effectiveness 
parameter: rural 
Med Low   
nu’ Insurgent combat effectiveness 
parameter: urban 
Low Low   
Table 10.   Revised Parameters of Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency 
When the revised parameters are input into the insurgency model, the 
combined effects of investments in information operations are dramatic (Figure 
17). In the baseline case, the result after three hundred ‘engagements’ was 
stalemate; when a comprehensive IO strategy is implemented, the 
counterinsurgents quickly gain the upper hand in the conflict, and ultimately ‘win’ 
the fight. Of all the parameters that are changed in Table 10, the reduction in 
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insurgent’s rural growth parameter and the corresponding increase in the 
government’s growth in rural areas have the greatest combined impact on the 
model. This combined effect is presumed to be the result of new and credible 
channels to reach rural audiences, increased intelligence on insurgent activities, 
psychological efforts to boost support of the population, and lasting civic action 
programs. Furthermore, government efforts to liberalize media access and 
freedom of expression in the cities are presumed to have a stabilizing effect in 
the cities, which preserves the counterinsurgent advantage there.  
Projected Course of Insurgency in Nepal
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Figure 16.   Nepal Insurgency Scenario with IO Strategies 
Obviously, the assumptions embedded in the model lead to an extremely 
positive result for the counterinsurgents. In reality, changes proposed in this 
discussion would not miraculously happen over night; rather, there would be an 
incremental implementation of the tools, which would be calibrated by periodic 
assessments of the campaign. More importantly, the Maoists are shrewd 
operators, and would likely develop counter-information strategies as the conflict 
progresses. Further modeling work may be done to assess the discrete effects of 
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these additional factors, but the tools and analysis provided by this paper affirm 
the positive effects of information based approaches to the problems of 
mobilization and attrition. Furthermore, even with the crude model of this paper, it 
may be asserted that the simple introduction of more counterinsurgent combat 
forces into this specific conflict—without changing any other parameters of the 
equation—always results in a stalemate. This simple assertion sums up the 
power of rural mobilization in insurgent conflict. If the tools of information 
operations can favorably break this dynamic in any manner, they are worth 
trying. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
This paper has identified many constraints that bound Nepalese 
counterinsurgency efforts: political fissures between the King and politicians; 
unity of effort among all security elements; limited resources and infrastructure; 
challenging topography; a diverse and backwards society; and waning public and 
international support. It is indeed tempting to look at the situation as bleak and 
irreversible. However, if one takes a hard look at these factors, the Nepalese 
government may gain positive control of almost every one (except topography) 
and turn them around. This is not to say that the task would be easy, quick, or 
unchallenged by the Maoists.  
What is most needed at this point is a sense of purpose and strategic 
priorities; arguably, that is exactly what the King intended to establish in his 1 
February 2005 proclamation as he assumed direct control of the country: 
We have no interest other than the restoration of sustainable peace 
and exercise in meaningful democracy for the welfare of Nepal and 
Nepalese people. . . . Let no Nepalese feel compelled to take up 
arms as a means of expressing frustration or disenchantment. At 
the same time, it must be ensured that every citizen has the 
opportunity to express discontent effectively without jeopardizing 
social harmony. It is clear that what the people want are a 
meaningful exercise in democracy, an effective market economy, 
good governance, transparency and a corruption-free rule of law. 
Our only wish is to guarantee our people's happiness through 
democracy, instill hope among the youth for a brighter future and to 
ensure dignity for Nepal amongst the comity of nations. Equal 
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opportunities for the development of all our languages, peoples and 
their cultures alone can preserve and consolidate the Kingdom's 
distinct characteristics.143 
Unfortunately, the government has yet to align all of its policies and actions with 
the King’s promises and intentions, as this paper has discussed at length. 
In practical terms, a recommended path to implement the information 
strategies proposed in this paper includes the following incremental steps: 
• Resolve impasse with political parties through a constructive 
power-sharing arrangement until conditions support full restoration 
of representative government 
• Creation of credible information channels through full restoration 
and cooperation with independent public media 
• Improve basic security in villages, radiating outward from security 
force cantonment areas; improve practice of OPSEC in these areas 
• Increase local population control measures and provide basic 
public services through CMO activities 
• Publicize rural successes through an aggressive PA and PSYOP 
campaign; follow through fairly on promises and threats made 
• Increase use and sharing of non-traditional ISR provided by local 
administrators, security personnel, and citizen watch groups 
• Expand reach and robustness of secure communications networks 
to facilitate intelligence, security, and administrative functions 
• Solicit foreign military and investment aid to improve technical 
intelligence, communications, and non-lethal equipment 
• Expand infrastructure and economic development programs in 
areas that have permanent security and administrative presence 
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The above steps are not a definite blueprint for success, but each one is 
an important piece of a complex, holistic strategy to address the parameters and 
dynamics that have the most impact on the insurgency. What is clear is that 
massive expansion of troop strength is of little value if simply thrown into the fight 
as ‘cannon fodder;’ however, if such forces are used to support information-
based activities such as those presented in this paper, dramatically better results 
may be achieved.  
D. U.S. SUPPORT 
In light of the political insularity that defines Nepal’s relations with the 
world, and to avoid playing into the psychological trap put forth by the Maoist 
insurgents, foreign supporters must tread very lightly in the ongoing conflict. This 
caution is especially important for the U.S., as it was singled out by the Maoists 
as a foreign intruder. Even with this constraint, there are several constructive 
measures that the U.S. may take to support Nepal’s information-based 
counterinsurgency campaign. 
The U.S. has tremendous expertise in the individual fields of information 
activities described in this report. It may help by offering military, diplomatic, and 
especially private advisement and material support in such areas as information 
operations planning; media relations; intelligence fusion and analysis; 
telecommunications and Internet infrastructure planning; OPSEC; computer and 
electronic systems protection; and C4 systems. Some of these offerings would be 
administered by the State Department or the Department of Defense because of 
the specialized nature of the operations; however, the vast majority could be 
executed through financial aid to the Nepalese government through Nepalese 
and international NGOs. 
What is most important is that the foreign donor helps, and does not hurt, 
the situation in Nepal. Requests or offers of support must be calibrated by 
considering what effects the proposed assistance has on the dynamics of 
insurgency. The simple model provided in this report is a low-resolution but 



























This paper presented a theoretical framework wherein insurgency is 
defined as a contest of competing political systems for absolute control of a 
population and its resources. In the course of discussing the conflict in terms of 
systems, dynamics, strategy and tactics, it is very easy to overlook the most 
important element of this power struggle—the affected people. At the end of the 
day, progress in this form of conflict is measured by the extent of popular support 
to either side. Mao claimed that “political power comes from the barrel of the 
gun;”144 perhaps this logic explains why there have been scant examples of 
victorious Maoist insurgencies apart from the revolution led by Mao himself in 
China. While guns may be useful and necessary at times, history suggests 
instead that successful insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are enabled and 
implemented by, with, and through the support of people. It follows that the 
contestant who is perceived to best meet the needs and aspirations of the people 
will ultimately win the contest. 
It is clear why theorists contend that only a holistic strategy, which 
addresses the wide array of an affected population’s problems, can succeed in 
beating insurgents. Improving people’s lives through better security, fair and 
competent governance and services, accessible and equitable judicial systems, 
and meaningful development of infrastructure, health, education, and economies 
are all essential to eliminate root causes and rallying cries for insurgency. More 
importantly, these measures are essential to gain the trust and support of 
affected people, which manifests itself in more and better information on the 
insurgents being reported by the population. Of course, there is also a time and 
place for the state to exert overwhelming military force to capture or destroy 
insurgent leadership and armed personnel. The overriding challenge for a 
government that is countering insurgents is to calibrate its actions so as to 
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achieve maximum gains and minimum losses in the fight. The lifeblood that 
supports this calibration process is information; thus, key counterinsurgency 
tasks are generating, exploiting, and (where necessary) denying information.  
Proper conceptualization of the insurgency problem and its ultimate 
solution is laudable; understanding and accepting this reality, however, is only 
the first step of the resolution process. Leaders must follow this step with a 
commitment to change. The observations of Nepalese analyst Deepak Thapa 
encapsulate the disillusionment and cynicism prevalent in Nepal today, “People 
are tired of promises; they want words followed by action—from the King, the 
politicians, and the Maoists.”145  
Unless and until such a commitment is made to the people of Nepal and 
truly acted upon, it is hard to foresee an end to conflict there. The King declared 
support for democracy and civil rights, but stripped these elements from citizens 
in the latest state of emergency. The politicians claim to serve the people through 
governance and service, but they failed to stem corruption and resolve inequities 
plaguing society. Finally, the Maoists’ core promise is to improve the lives of the 
oppressed Nepalis, but they continue to destroy infrastructure and commit 
atrocities. Given this track record, it’s no wonder why average Nepalis are 
distrustful and defeated; actions have simply not matched up with words. 
Lest this paper end on a sour note, however, the government and people 
of Nepal and their supporters should draw hope and strength from the words of 
ancient Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu: “The journey of a thousand miles begins 
with a single step.” If all parties to the conflict truly have the interests of the 
people at heart, there can be slow and steady resolution of Nepal’s insurgency, 
one step at a time. The analytical framework, strategies, and tactics proposed by 
this thesis are all part of a package aimed at calibrating counterinsurgency 
actions to meet the government’s stated intentions and promises to the affected 
population. As discussed above, the primary ingredient in this counterinsurgency 
package is information. This analysis provided a fresh appreciation of how, when,                                             
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and why information, information systems, and information operations may be 
the critical—but thus far, untapped—elements in Nepal’s counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
At the end of the day, Nepal must decide its own fate. If the insurgency 
stays on its current path, as all signs indicate, there are real doubts as to which 
side in the conflict will be the victor and what the resulting state will look like. If, 
however, the Nepalese government can unify the efforts of the King, the political 
parties, and the people, then commit to a holistic and well-calibrated 
counterinsurgency strategy, there is genuine hope for a successful outcome.  
In this light, there is a limited but vital role for the United States and other 
foreign supporters to play in resolving Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. Most 
importantly, the United States and others can refrain from giving bad advice and 
unproductive or counter-productive support. Technical assistance, lethal or non-
lethal military hardware, and financial aid must be evaluated in the context of 
such aid’s effects on the dynamics of the insurgency. Nepal may always say “no” 
to external advice; similarly, the United States and others can evaluate and reject 
Nepalese requests if they don’t “add up” in the calculus of insurgency. Generally, 
however, the United States would be constructive by offering expertise, materiel, 
and financial aid in the areas surrounding information operations. 
Finally, while the ideas and assertions of this paper are potentially useful 
tools to inform Nepal’s counterinsurgency strategy and to postulate effective 
actions, they cannot predict ultimate success in the conflict. Strategy must be 
paired with the will and commitment to act, and then followed through with skilled 
and disciplined execution in the field. Success in Nepal’s counterinsurgency will 
rest partly in the hands of the government’s agents implementing strategy, but it 
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